University of Miami Law Review
Volume 45

Number 5

Article 8

5-1-1991

Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water Act Provide an Effective
Remedy to Downstream States or Is There Still Room Left for
Federal Common Law?
Maria V. Maurrasse

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons

Recommended Citation
Maria V. Maurrasse, Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water Act Provide an Effective Remedy to
Downstream States or Is There Still Room Left for Federal Common Law?, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 1137
(1991)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol45/iss5/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water Act
Provide an Effective Remedy to Downstream
States or Is There Still Room Left for
Federal Common Law?
I.
II.

III.

INTRODUCTION .........................................................
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION DISPUTES..
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION LEGISLATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

...................................................................
A. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 .........................
B. Water Quality Act of 1965 ........................................
C. Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972 ..............................

IV.

V.

1138
1142

1. TECHNOLOGY-BASED EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS ....................
2. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS ....................................

1146
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150

3.

1151

NATIONAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM ..........

IMPACT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS

OF

1972

ON THE

FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE .................................

1152

A.
B.

1152
1154

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II) ........................
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette .................................

THE OKLAHOMA V. EPA DECISION ......................................

A . Facts ..........................................................
B . A nalysis ........................................................
1.

PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT ............................

2.

SUPREME COURT INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CASES DECIDED

1158
1158
1162
1162

AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF

1972:
3.

MIL WAUKEE 1 AND OUELLETTE ...........................

CLEAN WATER ACT PROVISIONS .................................

a. 33 U .S.C. § 1341(a)(2) .....................................
b. 33 U .S.C.§ 1342(d)(2) .....................................
c. 33 U .S.C.§ 1365(h) ........................................
C. Critique ........................................................

VI.

VII.

1165
1166
1167
1168

POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE OKLAHOMA v. EPA DECISION..

1169
1174

a. Imposition of Exceedingly Stringent Water Quality Standards by
Downstream States ..........................................
b. Control over Another Sovereign State's Industrial Economy .....
c. Excessive EPA Power .......................................

1175
1176
1176

1. TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT ......

2.

1164
1165

THE INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO ABATE INTERSTATE
WATER POLLUTION EFFECTIVELY AND EQUITABLY ......................

1177

A. The Clean Water Act Is Inadequate to Abate Interstate Water Pollution..
B. FederalLegislation Is Inherently Inadequate to Abate Interstate Water
Pollution........................................................

1177
1179

FEDERAL COMMON LAW: THE BETTER APPROACH FOR AN EQUITABLE
AND EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROVERSIES ........................................................

1179

A. Advantages of the Application of Federal Common Law ................
B. Possible Criticism ................................................

1182
1187

1.

LACK OF UNIFORMITY ...........................................

2.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES ............................................

1137

1187
1189

1138

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
3.

VIII.

[Vol. 45:1137
1189

INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS .....................................

CONCLUSION ..........................................................

1191

It is a question of the first magnitude whether the destiny of the
great rivers is to be the sewers of the cities along their banks or to
be protected against everything which threatens their purity.
Justice Holmes'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The notoriety that water pollution2 has enjoyed during the last
few decades is a novelty. Pollution itself, however, has existed for
centuries3 due to man's early practice of using bodies of water to dispose of wastes.' This practice extended into modem times5 as growing cities burgeoned around rivers and continued to use the waters as
a depository6 for the increasing volume of sewage and garbage. 7 The

problem of water pollution deepened as more wastes became inorganic in nature,8 and generally did not decompose as readily as

organic wastes. 9 As a result, water systems which were once selfcleaning could no longer purge themselves of the increased wastes.
Given the irrecusable law of nature, the movement of water does
not observe political or governmental boundaries.l 0 Accordingly, pollutants discharged into an interstate body of water in an upstream
state (the source state) may transcend geographical barriers and affect
the water located within a downstream state (the affected state). The
1. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1905).
2. "Pollution of the water ... is the addition of undesirable foreign matter which
deteriorates the quality of the water." A. TURK, J. TURK & J. WITTES, ECOLOGY POLLUTION
ENVIRONMENT 109 (1972).
3. For a historical account of river pollution, see L. KLEIN, ASPECTS OF RIVER
POLLUTION 1-8 (1957).
4. See id. at 3; M. LIPPMANN & R. SCHLESINGER, CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION IN THE
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 250 (1979).
5. For a discussion of the effect of the Industrial Revolution, see L. KLEIN, supra note 3,
at 3; R. LINTON, TERRACIDE: AMERICA'S DESTRUCTION OF HER LIVING ENVIRONMENT
208 (1970).
6. See L. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 3.
7. See id. at 1.
8. Inorganic wastes include inert wastes, toxic wastes, and radioactive wastes. See id. at
62-63. For example, in 1972 industrial wastes contributed to 60 percent of all U.S. water
pollution. THE COMPLETE ECOLOGY FACT BOOK 221 (P. Nobile & J. Deedy eds. 1972).
9. Organic wastes are those wastes that "derive from living organisms." WEBSTER'S
SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 594 (1971). Water decomposes organic wastes
with large quantities of oxygen. Historically, rivers cleansed themselves of organic waste and
restored dissolved oxygen within a few miles of the pollution source by natural tumbling and
aeration. Goldman & Shoop, What Is Pollution?, in CONTROLLING POLLUTION: THE
ECONOMICS OF A CLEANER AMERICA 60 (M. Goldman ed. 1967).
10. R. HARRIS, INTERSTATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 2 (1974).
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dynamic nature of water pollution leads to interstate pollution and,
eventually, to interstate disputes.
One of the seminal complications in resolving these types of disputes stems from the different interpretations of what constitutes
good, or necessary, environmental regulation. The answer to this
query may depend upon the designated uses the disputing states have

for the particular body of water." For instance, water that is suited
for industrial use may not be safe for household use, and vice versa.12
Similarly, water that is considered polluted for one use may not be for
another use. Therefore, interstate water pollution disputes may arise
merely because the upstream state uses the common resource in a way
that renders it unsuitable for the intended purpose of the downstream
state.
Another compelling factor leading to interstate water pollution

disputes is the disparity among states over what constitutes good environmental policy. 13 This disparity stems from the varying burdens
and benefits that each state derives from the pollution. A state that
receives some benefit, whether economic or otherwise, from the polluting activity it allows within its borders is more likely to accept or

withstand pollution than an affected state that only receives the ensu-

ing burdens of the water pollution.' 4
Such a difference in the distribution of benefits and burdens led
to the interstate dispute in Oklahoma v. EPA. I' In that case, the
Environmental Protection Agency issued a permit 16 to a new $40 million sewage treatment plant' 7 located in Arkansas, the upstream
source state.' 8 In an effort to protect Beaver Lake, 1' the primary

source of drinking water for approximately 200,000 northwest Arkan11. Goldman & Shoop, supra note 9, at 59.
12. Id.
13. L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5 (1984).
14. See Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 203 (1974)
("Localities will doubtless differ in the value they put on the environment, and environmental
standards will thus differ among localities.").
15. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990).
16. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA is ultimately responsible for issuing permits. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988). The EPA, however, may delegate the power of issuing permits to
qualified states. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988). In Oklahoma v. EPA, the EPA was the
permitting authority because Arkansas did not have a qualified permit issuing system. 908
F.2d at 598. Nonetheless, even in those states that have qualified permit programs, EPA

retains oversight authority. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1988).
17. Court Halts Plant'sDischarge, ENGINEERING NEws-REc., Aug. 23, 1990, at 8.
18. The Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Department ordered the City of
Fayetteville to upgrade its treatment facilities "or face a ban on new sewer hookups in the
city." Untitled, UPI, May 26, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
19. Id.
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sas residents, the plant discharged half of its wastes into an interstate
stream that eventually flowed into Oklahoma, the affected downstream state.2 ° Oklahoma objected to the issuance of the permit,
claiming that the wastes emitted by the Arkansas plant into the interstate stream violated the water quality standards that Oklahoma had
established under the Clean Water Act.2" Oklahoma received the
resulting burdens of a deteriorated water quality of the Illinois River
and of a deteriorated economy without receiving any benefit whatsoever.2 2 Arkansas, on the other hand, received the benefit of the sewage treatment plant: namely, the protection of its own drinking water
supply. In passing on this dispute, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals broadly held that under the Clean Water Act,23 Arkansas,
the upstream state, must abide by the more stringent water quality
standards of Oklahoma, the downstream state. 24 This was the first
time a United States court of appeals reached the merits on the issue
and determined whether a state's water quality standard, established
under the Clean Water Act, may receive extraterritorial effect and
thus regulate out-of-state dischargers.2 5
20. Untitled, UPI, Sept. 6, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
21. States may implement more stringent water quality standards than those set by the
Clean Water Act itself. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(1) (1988).
22. Oklahoma Governor George Nigh Tuesday stated, "'The Illinois River is not only a
very scenic area but is very important to the economy of northeastern Oklahoma.... We must
protect this valuable resource.' " Nigh Launches Four-Pronge (sic) Plan to Protect Illinois
River, UPI, May 29, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
24. The court wrote: "In conclusion, we hold that the Clean Water Act requires point
sources to comply with the federally approved water quality standards of affected downstream
states." Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 545, 634 (10th Cir. 1990).
25. A similar issue arose in 1983 in the dispute between Champion International
Corporation, the State of Tennessee, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Although
Champion was located in North Carolina approximately twenty-six miles from the Tennessee
border, it discharged the wastes from its pulp and paper mill plant into the Pigeon River, an
interstate river that eventually flows into Tennessee. State v. Champion Int'l Corp., 709
S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tenn. 1986). In its production process, the mill was diverting daily 46.4
million gallons of the river's total flow of only 48 million gallons. Champion Int'l Corp. v.
EPA, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988). Thus, the Pigeon River was extensively polluted with
wastes from the mill. The State of Tennessee filed the initial suit in Tennessee state court to
enjoin Champion's discharges into the Pigeon River. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied
the state relief, holding that the Clean Water Act preempted the application of both state and
federal common law to interstate water pollution disputes. 709 S.W.2d at 575.
This was not the end of the dispute, however. The EPA, realizing that Champion's
discharges were affecting the water quality standards of Tennessee, the downstream state,
required that Champion's discharges conform to Tennessee's water standards. Champion Int'l
Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390, 1394 (W.D.N.C. 1986). Champion opposed such a
requirement and filed suit in the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
seeking a reversal of the Administrator's permit. Id. at 1390. Responding to a summary
judgment motion, the district court ruled in favor of EPA, concluding that although
[n]othing in the regulatory framework surrounding the [Clean Water Act] would
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In holding that the downstream state's water quality standards
govern in water pollution disputes, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the
Clean Water Act in a manner not explicitly addressed by the legislature.2 6 The court's decision was probably motivated by a genuine
desire to add clarity to deficient provisions of the Clean Water Act
and to respond to the extensive criticism of the Act's failure to abate
water pollution.2 7 This Comment argues that given the vague nature
of the text of the Clean Water Act and the indeterminate legislative
history concerning the extrajurisdictional effect of other states' more
stringent state water quality standards, the Tenth Circuit's ruling in
Oklahoma v. EPA is extreme and unsupported by either the Act's
explicit provisions or its legislative history. Section II provides a historical perspective on the federal common law nuisance remedy available in interstate water pollution disputes prior to the enactment of
the Clean Water Act. Section III offers a brief summary of federal
water pollution legislation by focusing on the Clean Water Act. Section IV discusses the effect of the Clean Water Act amendments on
the federal common law of nuisance. Section V analyzes the
Oklahoma v. EPA decision by examining relevant provisions of the
Clean Water Act. Section VI examines the inability of federal legislation to effectively and equitably abate interstate water pollution.
automatically require that a source state comply with the water quality standards
of every downstream state. . . . [T]he EPA administrator does retain the
discretion to assume permitting authority if he concludes that the discharges will
have an undue impact on interstate waters.
Champoin Int'l Corp. v. EPA, 652 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
Champion argued that under International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987),
the court must apply the law of the discharging state, i.e. North Carolina. 652 F. Supp. at
1399. The court dismissed this argument by distinguishing between the statutory cause of
action in Champion and the state common law action at issue in Ouellette, stating: "If the
matter before this court had been a common law nuisance action and if this court had applied
Tennessee's tort law, Ouellette would require a recall of this court's decision. However, this
was not a nuisance action." Id. at 1399.
For a discussion of the Champion cases, see Comment, The Dilemma of the Downstream
Plaintiffin an Interstate Water Pollution Case, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 257 (1988/1989).
26. See infra Section V.
27. For criticisms of the Clean Water Act, see Crider, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a
Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 CHl.[-]KENT L. REV. 619, 644 (1988) (noting that courts
have interpreted the Clean Water Act as referring to a state's right to control only those
discharges located within its borders); Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts. The Role of the
Federal Courts, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241 (1982) (discussing problems in relying on
Congress and federal administrators to deal with interstate problems such as interstate water
pollution); Comment, supra note 25, at 294 (the Clean Water Act is not all-encompassing and
the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System is not working); Comment, Private
Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 734, 734-35 (1970) ("Massive legislation
... cannot help but leave gaps to be filled by the courts."); Comment, Milwaukee II Federal
Judicial Review of State-Issued Permits That Have Interstate Effects?, 60 J. URB. L. 583, 610
(1983) ("[I]nterstices still exist under the [Clean Water Act] ... ").
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Lastly, Section VII argues that absent a new and clear congressional
mandate, reinstatement of the federal common law is the most adequate and effective method of dealing with interstate water pollution
between states, for it would effectuate a better compromise between
national uniformity, predictability, and abatement.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERSTATE WATER
POLLUTION DISPUTES

Parties to interstate environmental law disputes in the United
States invoke the common law of nuisance 28 more frequently than any
other tort.2 9 Its popularity stems from the action's ability to prevent
neighbors within their property from engaging in behavior that negatively affects others. This cause of action thus recognizes that the
right to use one's property is not absolute. The basic restrictions are
fundamentally ones of fairness: an owner of a property may use the
rights inherent to ownership only to the extent that they do not cause
material injury or annoyance to a neighbor's use and enjoyment of
property. 30 During the early part of this century, federal courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, effectively expanded the
nuisance concept of "reasonable use" beyond private disputes and
into the realm of public interstate pollution to redress the injury
caused by pollution originating in other states. By applying the public
nuisance cause of action in interstate water pollution disputes, the federal courts implicitly recognized that an affected state, in an effort to
protect its residents from environmental injury caused by another
state, may sue the source state under the principle of parens patriae3
Before the enactment of the Clean Water Act, interstate water
pollution disputes were adjudicated through the application of the
28. Black's Law Dictionary defines a nuisance as "that activity which arises from
unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use by a person of his own property, working
obstruction or injury to the right of another, or to the public, and producing such material
annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort that law will presume resulting damage." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1065 (6th ed. 1990).
29. J. ARBUCKLE, N. BRYSON, D. CASE, C. CHERNEY, R. HALL, J. MARTIN, J. MILLER,
M. MILLER, W. PEDERSEN, R. RANDLE, R. STOLL, T. SULLIVAN & T. VANDERVER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 9 (9th ed. 1987) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK]; V. YANNACONE,

B.

COHEN

& S.

DAVIDSON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND

REMEDIES 77 (1972).
30. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 10.
3 1. Black's Law Dictionary defines "parens patriae" as "literally 'Parent of the country,'
refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal
disability .... It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests
such as health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general economy of
the state, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
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federal common law of nuisance. a2 This application, however, was
not initially successful since technology was not sufficiently developed
to monitor water quality with the degree of accuracy necessary to
prove injury.
Such a technological obstacle arose in the 1908 case of Missouri
v. Illinois,33 the first dispute involving interstate water pollution to
reach the Supreme Court.3 4 In that case, the State of Missouri sought
to enjoin the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago
from discharging sewage through an artificial channel into the
Desplaines River in Illinois.3 5 Missouri proceeded under the federal
common law theory of nuisance, alleging that the discharge into its
waters imposed an "actual, substantial, continuous, immediate and
irreparable" harm.36 In 'an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the
Court, although recognizing its power to settle such disputes among
states,3 7 held that Missouri had failed to prove the damages that it
claimed.38 However, the Court implicitly recognized the application
of a federal common law of nuisance to interstate pollution disputes
by concluding that, had Missouri proved substantial deterioration of
its waters, relief may have been awarded. 9
32. Between 1905 and 1931 alone, the Supreme Court heard four interstate water pollution
cases: New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296 (1920); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1914); Missouri v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 496 (1905).
33. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1905); see also Comment, supra note 25, at 275-76;
Note, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, Clearing the Muddied Preemption Waters of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 17 CAP. U.L. REV. 501 (1989).
34. Earlier cases dealt with conflicts between the states over shared natural resources. See,
e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 621 (1851) (dispute
over bridge's obstruction of interstate waterway's traffic). Missouri v. Illinois first addressed
one state's excessive pollution of another state's waters. See Note, City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois" The Demise of the FederalCommon Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 627,
631 (tracing federal interstate nuisance law to Missouri v. Illinois).
35. Note, supra note 33, at 517.
36. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 504. Missouri alleged that the Illinois discharges
caused an increase in the typhoid mortality rate among its citizens. Id. at 522-23.
37. Id. at 519 ("The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to
controversies between two or more States and between a State and citizens of another State.").
38. The Court wrote:
There is nothing which can be detected by the unassisted senses, no visible
increase of filth, no new smell.... The plaintiff's case depends upon an inference
of the unseen....
... [E]verything is involved in doubt. The data upon which an increase in
No case of
the deaths from typhoid fever in St. Louis is alleged are disputed ....
an epidemic caused by infection at so remote a source is brought forward and the
cases which are produced are controverted. . . . [T]here is a categorical
contradiction between the experts on the two sides.
Id. at 522-23.
39. Technical proof appears to have been the major stumbling block for Missouri, the
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Nine years after the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Missouri v. Illinois, it heard arguments in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,"
its second interstate pollution case. In Tennesee Copper, the State of
Georgia sought to enjoin the Tennessee Copper Company and the
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Company from emitting sulfur
fumes which would eventually reach Georgia. 4' In finding that Georgia failed to make a substantial showing,4 2 the Court implicitly held
once more that common law remedies were available to deal with
interstate pollution disputes.4 3
In the 1920 case of New York v. New Jersey," the State of New
York sought to enjoin New Jersey from implementing a sewer system,
alleging that it would pollute the waters of the Hudson and East Rivers. 45 Although the Court recognized that New York's right to sue
New Jersey was "very clear,"' 46 it refused to render an injunction
because the evidence was, again, "much too meager and indefinite." 4
Once more, the Court implicitly reinforced its belief in a potentially
successful interstate pollution suit by dismissing the case without prejudice. 48 The Court allowed New York to refile if the proposed sewer
in operation "prove[d] sufficiently injurious to the waters of the
Bay."

49

In 1931, the Supreme Court effectively used nuisance principles
to decide New Jersey v. New York City.5 0 There, the State of New
Jersey sought to enjoin the City of New York from dumping large
quantities of garbage into the ocean because the garbage would ultiaffected state. The Court dismissed the case without prejudice, allowing either party to apply
for later relief. Id. at 478. In its conclusion, the Supreme Court stated:
We might go more into detail, but we believe that we have said enough to explain
our point of view and our opinion of the evidence as it stands. What the future
may develop of course we cannot tell. But our conclusion upon the present
evidence is that the case proved falls so far below the allegations of the bill that it
is not brought within the principles heretofore established in the cause.
Id. at 526.
40. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1914). See Note, supra note 33, at
503.
41. Tennessee Copper, 237 U.S. at 475-76.
42. The Court held that "[t]he evidence does not disclose with accuracy the volume or true
character of the fumes which are being given off daily from the works of either company." Id.
at 477.
43. The Court retained the cause for further action and allowed either party to apply for
later relief. Id. at 478.
44. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1920).
45. Id. at 298.
46. Id. at 301 ("The right of the state to maintain such a suit ... is very clear.").
47. Id. at 309-10.
48. Id. at 314.
49. Id.
50. New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931).
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mately wash up on New Jersey beaches. 5 ' Following the recommendation of the Court-appointed Master,5 2 the Court recognized that
New York City's actions constituted a nuisance to New Jersey.5 3 The
Court thus granted an injunction that directed the City of New York
to implement an acceptable method for discarding its garbage.54
New Jersey v. New York City finally offered the Court evidence
sufficient to recognize an interstate nuisance. In that case, the Court
did not have to reach for "an inference of the unseen"'5 or speculate
about possible pollution, 6 as it had been called to do in the interstate
pollution cases it had entertained in the previous twenty-six years.
The harm was perceptible and extensive, even by 1931 standards.5 7

New Jersey v. New York City stands for the proposition that federal
courts could successfully apply federal common law and use their
equitable powers to effectively abate interstate pollution if the harm is

proven substantial.
In the 1972 case of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee I),5"
the Supreme Court applied federal common law to an interstate water
pollution dispute for the last time. 59 In that case, the Court reaf-

firmed its faith in federal common law and declared that "federal
courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging
creation of a public nuisance by water pollution."' 6 The Court realized that in suits between states, equity is best achieved by applying
the facts peculiar to the particular case. 6'
51. Id. at 476-77.
52. "[T]he Master reports that the defendant has created and continues to create a public
nuisance on the property of New Jersey and that the latter is entitled to relief in accordance
with the prayer of its complaint, but that the defendant should be given reasonable time within
which to put into operation sufficient incinerators." Id. at 481.
53. Id. at 481, 483.
54. Id. at 483. Recognizing the impracticability of an immediate injunction, the Court
afforded the City of New York time to put into operation sufficient amount of incinerators to
handle its garbage disposal needs. Id.
55. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 522 (1905).
56. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1920).
57. Id. at 478 ("Vast amounts of garbage are cast on the beaches by the waters of the
ocean and extend in piles and windrows among them. These deposits are unsightly and
noxious, constitute a menace to public health and tend to reduce property values.").
58. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), 406 U.S. 91 (1971).
59. After the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act of 1972, the
Supreme Court interpreted that Act as providing such a comprehensive water pollution
regulatory system as to preempt all federal common law causes of action in the area of
interstate water pollution. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I1), 451 U.S. 304 (1981);
see supra Section IV.
60. Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 107.
61. Id. at 107-08.
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FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION LEGISLATION OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

Prior to the enactment of federal water pollution legislation, legislators viewed the area as one of traditional state authority. 62 Nonetheless, legislators eventually realized that this old regime was
ineffective at protecting the nation's waters from irreversible deterioration. This inefficiency stemmed from the broad discretion that
states customarily enjoyed in the area of pollution control, which in
turn stemmed from traditional principles of state rights. Although
legislators realized that in order to effectively abate interstate water
pollution it was necessary to enact federal legislation, they were
unable to discard the perception that state rights were superior to the
interests of the federal government. Consequently, early federal water
pollution statutes granted the federal government power only over
interstate waters, an area more easily claimed as "federal" without
infringing on the rights of the states.63
A.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948

The slow evolution of modern, comprehensive water pollution
control by the federal government began in 1948 with the enactment
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 194 8 ,64 the precursor
of the Clean Water Act. Typical of early pollution legislation, this
Act limited the power of the federal government in several crucial
ways, and thus subordinated the federal government to the states in
the area of pollution control. First, the Act did not allow the federal
government to review a state's water quality standards. 65 Second, the
federal government could only regulate interstate waters.66 Third,
62. See Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean
Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (1983).

63. This was recognized by Senator Randolph, from the Committee on Public Works, in a
report submitted to the Senate during the hearings on the Clean Water Act Amendments of
1971, where he commented:
For more than two decades, Federal legislation in the field of water pollution
control has been keyed primarily to an important principle of public policy: The
States shall lead the national effort to prevent, control and abate water pollution.
As a corollary, the Federal role has been limited to support of, and assistance to,
the States.
H.R. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1422 (1973), reprintedin 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1422 (1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT].

64. The Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155, Act of
June 30, 1948, ch. 758 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)); see also J.
DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 28 (1975).

65. Comment, supra note 25, at 262.
66. Id. at 264.
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enforcement rested solely with the state governors. 67 Fourth, federal
authority was strictly limited to situations where pollution endangered the health or welfare of persons in a state other than that in
which the discharges first occurred. 6' Given the rudimentary environmental technology available during the first half of the twentieth
century, plaintiffs found it difficult to provide the courts with the necessary proof.69 Finally, and most strikingly, the government could
not sue a state unless the state agreed to be sued.7 °
B.

Water Quality Act of 1965

Inadequacies of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948
and increasing water pollution problems prompted Congress to enact
the Water Quality Act of 1965.71 This Act was different from the
1948 Act in several ways. First, the Act allowed federal review of
state water quality standards. 72 Second, it gave the federal government the power to promulgate water quality standards for interstate
waters where state water quality standards did not satisfy the requirements of the Act. 73 Third, the Act authorized federal enforcement of
established water quality standards.7 4 These changes were important,
for they granted the federal government authority to intervene in pollution regulation even within state boundaries.
Nonetheless, a major flaw of the Water Quality Act was that primary responsibility and authority for promulgating and enforcing
water quality standards continued to rest with the individual states.75
The states, in turn, were very slow at promulgating the water quality
standards. For instance, by 1971, more than four years after the
deadline for submission of standards, only twenty-seven of the fiftyfour jurisdictions covered by the 1965 Act had enacted acceptable
water quality standards.7 6 As in the Water Pollution Act of 1948, the
federal government could compel enforcement only if the pollution
67. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 63, at 1420.
68. Comment, supra note 25, at 262.
69. See supra notes 28-61 and accompanying text.
70. Comment, supra note 25, at 263.
71. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; see also Gaba, supra note
62, at 1177; Comment, supra note 25, at 264; Note, Milwaukee v. Illinois" An Interstate Water
Pollution Dispute, 1 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 50, 55 (1983). Senator Muskie introduced the
Water Quality Act of 1965. J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, .upra note 64, at 32.
72. Gaba, supra note 62, at 1178.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 63, at 1420 ("Each

State was required by the 1965 Act to develop standards for water quality within its
boundaries.").
76. Id. at 1422.
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affected people living in another state and then only if the governor of
the source state consented or if the water quality of interstate waters
fell below the established standards." Another inadequacy of the
1965 Act was its lack of a deterrent mechanism for violators of the
prescribed water quality standards, even when their violations were
wilful or negligent. 78 The federal government's power to enforce the
Act thus proved to be more illusory than real. In fact, between 1952
and 1972 the Secretary of the Interior brought only one successful
action to court. 79 This lack of enforcement arose probably from the
government's burdens of locating the source of pollution and establishing causation.80
C.

Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972

By 1971 the inadequacies of the past federal pollution control
programs revealed themselves in a mortifying fashion: one-third of
the nation's sampled drinking water was unsafe;8 10 million fish were
dying daily in a Florida bay;8 2 and major waterways near the indus-

trial and urban areas were unfit for most purposes.8 3 Water pollution
had become so serious that Congress felt compelled to take action.84
As a result, on October 18, 1972, Congress, undeterred by President
Nixon's veto,85 passed the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972
77. Comment, supra note 25, at 264.
78. Id.
79. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 63, at 1423 ("The
record shows an almost total lack of enforcement. Under this procedure, only one case has

reached the courts in more than two years.").
80. Gaba, supra note 62, at 1179.
81. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 63, at 862.
82. Id. at 1253.
83. Id. at 1425.

84. Id. at 161, 753, 862, 1253, 1423, 1425. Congressmen realized that America's waters
were "in serious trouble." Id. at 753. Senator Muskie analogized the water pollution problem
as follows:
Our planet is beset with a cancer which threatens our very existence and
which will not respond to the kind of treatment that has been prescribed in the
past. The cancer of water pollution was engendered by our abuse of our lakes,
streams, rivers, and oceans; it has thrived on our half-hearted attempts to control
it; and like any other disease, it can kill us.
We have ignored this cancer for so long that the romance of environmental
concern is already fading in the shadow of the grim realities of lakes, rivers, and
bays where all forms of life have been smothered by untreated wastes, and oceans
which no longer provide us with food.
Id. at 161-62.
85. President Nixon rejected the Amendments because he considered them too expensive.
In his address to the Senate on October 17, 1972, President Nixon stated:
I am also concerned, however, that we attack pollution in a way that does not
ignore other very real threats to the quality of life, such as spiraling prices and
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("Clean Water Act") 86 the objective of which was to "restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of our
Nation's waters." 7 The Act specified that its two goals were to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 198588 and
to attain an interim goal of water quality which would provide "for
the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
[would provide] for recreation in and on the water by July 1, 1983." '89
Congress established three mechanisms to achieve these goals: effluent limitations, water quality standards, and a national enforcement
permit program.
1.

TECHNOLOGY-BASED EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS

One of the most important parameters set in the 1972 Amendments is the concept of effluent limitations. The purpose of effluent
limitations was to quantify the "rates and concentrations of chemical,
physical, biological and other constituents which are discharged from
point sources into navigable waters." 90 The EPA sets these effluent
limitations industry by industry, based on the technological and economic capabilities of the wastewater treatment facilities within a given
industry. (Consequently, these standards are called "technologybased effluent limitations.") More significantly, the Act specifically
provides for a increase in the stringency of these limitations in order
to allow industry to gradually meet the optimum standards. Accordingly, by July 1, 1977, the EPA had to set the effluent limitations
based on the "best practicable control technology," 9 1 and by July 1,
1983, the EPA had to set the effluent limitations based upon the
increasingly onerous taxes. Legislation which would continue our efforts to raise
water quality, but which would do so through extreme and needless
overspending, does not serve the public interest....
... For this reason I am compelled to withhold my approval from S.2770,
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972-a bill whose
laudable intent is outweighed by its unconscionable $24 billion price tag....
• . . [A]ny spending bill this year which would lead to higher prices and
higher taxes defies the signature by this President. I have nailed my colors to the
mast on this issue; the political winds can blow where they may.
Message From the President of the United States Returning Without Approval the Bill (S.
2770) Entitled "The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972," LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 63, at 137-38. For a historical discussion of the legislative action, see J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 64, at 39-44.
86. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
87. Id. § 1251(a).
88. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
89. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
90. Id. § 1362(l1).
91. Id. § 1311(b)(l)(A).
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stricter "best available technology. '92 These effluent limitations
became the standards that industry had to meet.
2.

WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

Another important parameter of the 1972 Amendments is the
concept of "water quality standards." These standards provide the
water quality criteria for designated uses of particular waters. Their
purpose is to "protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of the water and serve the purposes of [the] chapter. '93 In addition to the national water quality standards, the Act provides states
with a powerful tool in interstate disputes. They may promulgate
"state water quality standards applicable to intrastate waters." 94
When setting their own standards, the state must take into consideration factors such as the "waters' use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes and
agricultural, industrial and other purposes."9' 5 The Act also allows
states to impose stricter standards than are required under the Act.96
Nonetheless, this power is not absolute. A state must submit its water
quality standards to the EPA Administrator, who determines whether
the standard "meets the requirements of this chapter. ' 97 If the
Administrator approves the state's proposed water quality standard,
"such standard shall thereafter be the water quality standards for the
applicable waters of that state." '
Id. § 131 1(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
Id. § 1313(a)(3)(A).
Id.
Section 1370 states in pertinent parts as follows:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall
(1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or
interstate agency to adopt or enforce ... (B) any requirement respecting control
of abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation,
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of
performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or political subdivision or
interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other
limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of
performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or other
limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of
performance under this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters
(including boundary waters) of such States.
Id. § 1370.
97. Id. § 1313(c)(3).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

1991]

DOWNSTREAM STATE REMEDIES

3.

1151

NATIONAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM

The Clean Water Act's enforcement mechanism consists of a permit program called the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES").99 This program was designed to monitor and
implement the water quality standards and effluent limitations. It is
unlawful to discharge any pollutant unless the discharger does so in
accordance with an NPDES permit. "
The Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA to delegate the permit
issuing power to the states 1 ' as long as the state permit program
meets the requirements outlined in the Act. 102 If a state does not create such a program, the EPA continues to issue the permits in that
state.10 3 State permit programs nonetheless remain subject to review
by the EPA. If a state fails to enforce the national water quality standards of effluent limitations, the EPA may step in and compel compliance with the requirements, withdraw a state's permitting authority,
or both.' I Therefore, once the EPA has delegated permitting author-

ity to a state, the state has primary responsibility for setting its own
water quality standards, setting the effluent limitations, and enforcing
the permits. All are, of course, subject to an EPA veto.

The Act also provides for the imposition of civil penalties for a
violation of a permit or of the Act,"0 5 as well as criminal prosecution
upon a negligent or wilful violation of a permit condition or of the
Act.' 016 In addition to the enforcement provided for in the Act, states
99. Id. § 1342.
100. Id. § 1311 (a). For a discussion of the permit procedures, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 255-58.

101. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5) (1988).
102. For a listing of the requirements that a state permit program must possess for approval
by the Administrator, see id. § 1342(b).
103. As of 1987, three-fourths of the States had their own permit system.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 225.

104. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1).
105. Section 1319(b) provides in pertinent part as follows: "The Administrator is
authorized to commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or
temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order
under subsection (a) of this section." Id. § 1319(b).
106. The Act provides for criminal penalties for negligent violations and "knowing
violations." In the case of negligent violations:
Any person who(A) negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1226, 1317, 1318, 1328, or
1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any
such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the
Administrator or by a State ...
(B) negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly owned
treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such person
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may also impose their own established laws. However, if the EPA
disagrees, it may intervene.

IV.

IMPACT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF
ON THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE

1972

Since the enactment of the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments,
the Supreme Court has decided two cases concerning the application
of common law nuisance in interstate water pollution disputes: Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 11)107 and InternationalPaper
0 8 In these cases, the Court interpreted the Act as
Co. v. Ouellette."
diminishing the potential application of the federal common law of

nuisance in interstate water pollution disputes.
A.

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II)

The first interstate water pollution case to reach the Supreme
Court after the enactment of the 1972 Amendments to the Clean
Water Act was the 1980 case of Illinois v.
kee 11).19 In Milwaukee II, the Court
ments preempted the field of interstate
which proved correct the prediction that

City of Milwaukee (Milwauconcluded that the amendwater pollution, a holding
Justice Douglas made in an

earlier interstate water pollution case.110
knew or reasonably should have known could cause personal injury or
property damage...
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day
of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both.
Id. § 1319(c)(1).
In case of "knowing violations":
Any person who(A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or
1345 of this title, or any permit condition or limitation implementing any
such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the
Administrator or by a State...
(B) knowingly introduces into a sewer system or into a publically
owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such
person knew or reasonably should have known could cause personal injury
or property damage ... ;

shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 or more than $50,000 per day
of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both.
Id. § 1319(c)(2).
107. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
108. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
109. Milwaukee 11, 451 U.S. 304. For an overview of Milwaukee H, see Comment, supra
note 25, at 277-88; Note, supra note 33, at 502; Comment, supra note 27, at 583; The Supreme
Court, 1980 Term-Leading Cases, 95 HARV. L. REV. 290, 290-300 (1981).
110. In 1972, just months before the passage of the 1972 Amendments, the Supreme Court
decided Milwaukee I, which recognized that a federal common law nuisance action was
available to the plaintiff state. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Delivering
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The dispute between the State of Illinois and the City of Milwaukee"' arose from Milwaukee's daily discharge of more than 200 million gallons of sewage" 2 into the waters of Lake Michigan. 3 The
State of Illinois filed a federal common law action of nuisance, claiming that the discharge posed a danger to those of its citizens who
depended on Lake Michigan for their drinking water and bathing." 4
Entero viruses" 5' and pathogenic bacteria" 6 contained in the sewage
caused such life-threatening diseases as polio, meningitis, and encephalitis. 1 7 The City of Milwaukee responded that the discharges and
overflows did not violate its permit, and thus the nuisance cause of
action had to fail.' 18
In a 6-3 majority opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, the
Court held that the State of Illinois' federal common law nuisance
action must fail because the 1972 Amendments of the Clean Water
Act preempted the field of interstate water pollution, thus prohibiting
the application of federal common law.1 19 The Court began its analysis by declaring that "it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal
the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas warned that new federal laws may preempt the field
of interstate water pollution, eradicating the use of common law actions in such controversies.
Id. at 107; see also supra Section II.
I11. The three defendant dischargers were the City of Milwaukee, the Sewage Commission
of the City of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewage Commission of the County of
Milwaukee. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 308.
112. Id. at 308-09. The discharges were caused by overflows of untreated sewage from the
defendants' sewage system and by discharges of inadequately treated sewage from the
defendants' treatment plants. Id.
113. Lake Michigan is an interstate body of water bordered by Illinois and the City of
Milwaukee.
114. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 309.
115. Entero viruses are "a family of viruses which include the poliomyelitis, coxsackie and
echo groups of viruses. Their importance lies in their tendency to invade the central nervous
system. They receive their name from the fact that their mode of entry into the body is
through the gut." BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 249 (36th ed. 1990).
116. Pathogenic bacteria are those that cause or are capable of causing disease. Id. at 520.
117. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 167 n.32 (7th Cir. 1979).
118. The defendants had obtained discharge elimination permits from the Wisconsin
Department of National Resources, the EPA-approved state permitting agency. Milwaukee
II, 451 U.S. at 311. The permit, however, did not prohibit overflows but merely set a timetable
for the construction of additional mechanisms to control sewage overflow. Id.
119. Id. at 317 ("[C]ongress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to
the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and
maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of
a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency."). The
majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and
Powell. Justice Blackmun authored the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 332.
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law."' 120 The Court further concluded that Congress "has occupied
the field [of water pollution] through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program," 121 and that neither section 136522 nor
24
section 137 0 121 preserved common law.
The majority opinion provoked a vehement dissent by Justice
Blackmun, who argued that "Congress intended to preserve the federal common law of nuisance."12'

Furthermore, Blackmun asserted

that the application of state common law in such controversies undermines any possible "uniform federal approach to the problem of alleviating interstate pollution." 1 26 Blackmun contended that since the
Act did not address the issue of interstate water pollution, federal
courts should resort to federal common law causes of action to resolve
disputes among states in order to best fulfill the congressional objective of abating water pollution. Both the Court and the dissent left
open the issue of whether affected states could supplement the Clean
Water Act with their own state common law causes of action in an
effort to protect themselves from pollution emanating from source
states.
B.

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette

Six years after its decision in Milwaukee HI, the Supreme Court
was called to resolve the unanswered question of whether an affected
state in an interstate water pollution dispute could supplement the
Clean Water Act with its own state common law.' 2 7 The dispute in
120. Id. at 317.
121. Id.

122. Section 136 5(e) reads in pertinent part as follows: "Nothing in this section shall
restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other
relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(1988).
123. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
124. The Court read section 1365(e) narrowly to mean that the Citizen Suit provision only
supplants federal common law with regard to citizen suits. The Court thus rejected
Milwaukee's argument that section 1365(e) allows all federal common law to supplant the
entire Clean Water Act. Section 1370, as read by the Court, does not indicate that the more
stringent pollution limitations allowed under that section were to be established by "federal
court actions premised on federal common law." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II),
451 U.S. 304, 328-29 (1981).
125. Id. at 339.

126. Id.at 353.
127. This time, however, the case did not involve the application of federal common law as
it had in Milwaukee HI, but rather involved the application of state common law, and more
specifically, the application of the affected state's common law.
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InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette'2 8 involved the New York based
International Paper Company's ("IPC") routine discharge of effluents
from its paper-making plant into Lake Champlain-a body of water
29
that serves as part of the border between New York and Vermont.1
The plaintiff class, 162 owners of property along the Vermont side of

Lake Champlain, brought a Vermont common law action

30

against

the company, alleging that the discharges constituted a "continuing
nuisance31'' which interfered with the use and enjoyment of their

properties, consequently lowering their property values. 3 2 In addition to requesting injunctive relief, the class sought $20 million of
3
compensatory relief. ' 1

IPC moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the Clean Water
Act preempted the entire water pollution field, including the applica-

tion of state common law. The district court denied the motion to
dismiss, finding that the Clean Water Act authorized common law
suits.13 4 Moreover, the district court found that traditional tort and

conflicts-of-laws rules dictated that the controversy should be governed by the common law of the affected state.1 35 IPC appealed to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the
3 6
district court in a per curiam opinion.
The issue facing the Supreme Court was one of first impression:
whether the Clean Water Act authorized the application of state common law to an interstate water pollution dispute. In an opinion

128. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see also Note, supra note 33,
at 501; Comment, supra note 27, at 583.
129. These effluents consisted of waste generated from the production activities of the paper
mill. Ovellette, 479 U.S. at 484.
130. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D.Vt. 1985). The plaintiffs
originally brought this suit in Vermont state court but the suit was later removed to federal
court. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 484.
131. Id.
132. 602 F. Supp. at 266.
133. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief consisting of relocating the diffusion pipe
closer to the source of the discharges and further away from the New York-Vermont lake
border. Id.
134. Id. at 274 ("[T]he [Federal Water Pollution Control Act] authorizes actions to redress
injury caused by water pollution of interstate waters under the common law of the state in
which the injury occurred.").
135. The District Court wrote:
[Ilt
is completely reasonable to assume that Congress believed that a plaintiff
suffering in State A might sue under the laws of State A to recover for injuries
sustained as the result of pollution emanating from State B. It thus seems
inescapable that Congress, by passage of the [Federal Water Pollution Control
Act's] saving clause and state authority provisions, intended to preserve just such
an action.
Id. at 270.
136. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985).
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authored by Justice Powell, the Court held that although the Clean
Water Act authorized the application of the source state's common
law to interstate water pollution cases, it preempted the application of
the affected state's common law.' 37 Affected states would henceforth
be precluded from applying their common law when injured by pollution emanating from other states.

The Court began its preemption analysis by noting that there is a
presumption against the implicit preemption of state common law by
federal legislation. 138 It stated that the courts should interpret federal
statutes as preempting state common law only where there is a clear
indication that the preemption is consistent with the intent of Congress or when the state law "actually conflicts with a federal statute."1'39 Although recognizing that neither the statute's language nor
its legislative history elucidated the intent of Congress, 1" the Court
stated that a sufficiently comprehensive regulatory program can safely
be interpreted as preempting state common law.' 4 '
Since neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history
specified which actions were to be preserved, the Court in Ouellette
declared that the common law action would not be preempted unless
it was an obstacle to or conflicted with the "full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 4 2 The Court concluded that applying the stricter
pollution laws of Vermont to the New York discharge would interfere
with the chosen method of eliminating water pollution 43 and would
137. The Court concluded:
[I]f affected States were allowed to impose separate discharge standards on a
single point source, the inevitable result would be a serious interference with the
achievement of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Because we do not
believe Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a
general saving clause, we conclude that the CWA precludes a court from
applying the law of an affected State against an out-of-state source.
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1987) (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 486, 491 & n.ll.
139. Id. at 491. "Such a conflict will be found when the state law 'stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' " Id. at
491-92 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985)).
140. Id. at 493.
141. Id. at 491 ("Although courts should not lightly infer pre-emption, it may be presumed
when the federal legislation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation.") (citation omitted).
142. Id.
143. The Court wrote:
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law 'stands as an obstacle' to the full
implementation of the CWA, it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both
federal and state law is to eliminate water pollution. A state law also is preempted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed
to reach this goal.
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be inconsistent with Congress' objective of creating a predictable permit system.'" Moreover, the Court found that it was against the
intent of Congress, as expressed in the statute, to allow a state other
than the source state to dictate which effluents to the dischargers
outside its own borders.145

As in Milwaukee HI, the Justices differed on the interpretation of
the legislative history.146 Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan
accused the majority of erroneously assuming that "Congress valued
administrative efficiency more highly than effective elimination of
water pollution."' 47 In addition, the dissent persuasively pointed out
that the majority ignored well established conflict-of-law principles by
holding that a court is precluded in a common law action involving
interstate water pollution from applying the law of the affected state,
but must apply the law of the state where the injury occurred.' 48
Thus, as of 1987, amidst this tug-of-war between the Justices, an
affected state could pursue a common law nuisance action against an
out-of-state discharger only if the action was brought under the common law of the source state. This remedy may prove ineffective in
protecting affected states because the discharger located in the source
state will likely be in compliance with its own state's laws. More
importantly, the Court was unable to provide any convincing basis for
preferring the interests of the upstream state over those of the downstream state. Because Ouellette prohibited an affected state from compelling an out-of-state discharger to comply with its environmental
policies under a common law cause of action, it remained to be seen
whether affected states had some other recourse.
Id. at 494.
144. Id. at 496 ("Application of an affected State's law to an out-of-state source also would
undermine the important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system.").
145. The Court found that sections 1341 and 1342 demanded the conclusion that "[elven
though it may be harmed by the discharges, an affected State only has an advisory role in
regulating pollution that originates beyond its borders." Id. at 490. (emphasis added)
Consequently, the Court concluded that "[t]he Act makes it clear that affected States occupy a
subordinate position to source States in the federal regulatory program." Id. at 491 (emphasis
added).
146. Id. at 500 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissented as they had done in Milwaukee 1H. They were joined by Justice Brennan.
147. Id. at 504 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 501-02. Federal district courts employ a two-step analysis when determining
which state's tort law applies in interstate tort suits. First, the court "appl[ies] the conflict-oflaw rules of the State in which the court sits." Id. at 501 (citation omitted). Secondly, the
court interprets "these conflict-of-law principles ... to determine whether the tort law of the
source State or the affected State should be applied." Id. at 501-02.
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EPA DECISION

Given the preemption of federal common law in Milwaukee II
and the foreclosure of an affected state's common law in Ouellette, the
only recourse available to an affected state limited to the provisions of
the Clean Water Act. In this context, the State of Oklahoma filed suit
in federal court against the EPA seeking to prevent the discharge of
pollutants into its waters by an out-of-state Arkansas discharger. The
issue in Oklahoma v. EPA was whether the Clean Water Act, as
opposed to federal or state common law, allows redress to an affected
state.149 This issue was one of first impression in the federal courts of
appeals.
A.

Facts

In preparation for the operations of its new $40-million sewage
treatment plant, 15 0 the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas applied for a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.15 1 The permit was necessary' 5 2 because in the process of treating
12.2 million gallons per day of sewage, 15 3 the plant would discharge
6.1 million gallons per day into Mud Creek, a nearby stream.15 4
According to the proposed project, half of the discharges of the treatment plant would eventually flow into Oklahoma via the Illinois
River, an Arkansas-Oklahoma body of water commonly used for
recreation. 155
Oklahoma claimed that the discharges from the Fayetteville
treatment plant would degrade the quality of the Oklahoma portion
of the Illinois River, a segment of which had been "designated an
Oklahoma state scenic river and was proposed for study as a potential
addition to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System." 1 6 The discharges consequently violated Oklahoma's more stringent water qual149. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990).
150. Court Halts Plant's Discharge, ENGINEERING NEwS-REC., Aug. 23, 1990, at 8; Don't
Start Waste Wars ... or Water Wars, ENGINEERING NEwS-REC., Aug. 23, 1990, at 66.
151. Fayetteville is a small city of approximately 30,000 residents. Remick, Untitled, UPI,
Sept. 6, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
152. Section 1311 of the Clean Water Act states that, except as in compliance with § 1342,
among other sections, "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a). Section 1342, in turn, calls for the establishment of the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System-the Clean Water Act permit system.
153. Court Halts Plant's Discharge, ENGINEERING NEwS-REC., Aug. 23, 1990, at 8.
154. The permit called for a maximum of 6.1 million gallons of wastes per day. Untitled,
UPI, Nov. 6, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
155. Specifically, the discharge flowed into the Illinois River, which crosses into Oklahoma.

Id.
156. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990).
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ity standards. 15 7 But on November 5, 1985, despite strong opposition
from the State of Oklahoma and the other named parties, 5 the EPA
issued the permit. 5 9 The ensuing conflict tested the interstate enforcing power of the Clean Water Act and the power of states to resolve
this issue. 160
The State of Arkansas and the State of Oklahoma requested an
evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge ("AL") to
present arguments concerning the possible issuance of an NPDES
permit by EPA.16 ' Oklahoma appealed the issuance of the permit on
the premise that EPA had erred in deciding that the permit was in
compliance with Oklahoma water quality standards because the EPA
had failed to consider all the relevant factors. 162 The State of Arkansas, on the other hand, appealed the issuance of the permit on the
ground that the Clean Water Act does not allow the EPA to compel
upstream source states to abide by the more stringent water quality
157. Oklahoma's water quality standards were more stringent than the federal regulations
because of the state's anti-degradation policy, which states in pertinent parts: "No further
water quality degradation which would interfere with or become injurious to existing instream
water uses shall be allowed." Id. at 635 (appendix) (citing Oklahoma Water Quality Standards

§ 3).
158. The other plaintiffs in the case were the Oklahoma Scenic Rivers Commission and
Pollution Control Coordinating Board, and Save the Illinois River ("STIR"), a non-profit
Oklahoma environmental group. The other defendants in the case were the City of
Fayetteville, the Beaver Water District, the State of Arkansas, and the Arkansas Department
of Pollution Control and Ecology. The Oklahoma Wildlife Federation was granted right to
intervene. Id. at 597. Dottie Hoxie, a spokeswoman for STIR and Director of the Tahlequah
Chamber of Commerce, stated early in the controversy that the group "'plan[s] to fight it all
the way.'" Untitled, UPI, Nov. 6, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
159. The EPA was the issuing authority because the State of Arkansas did not have an
EPA-approved state permitting agency. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 598. Permit No.
AR0020010 "sets limits on the amounts of certain pollutants that may be discharged and
establishes maximum and minimum effluent concentrations of these pollutants and other
chemical parameters ... [and] prohibits the discharge of any incompletely treated effluent to
Mud Creek." Id. On November 5, 1985, Dick Whittington, an administrator of EPA's
Region 6 Office in Dallas, reportedly stated, " '[T]hepermit was issued after a review of letters
and petitions signed by more than 4,800 people and 32 statements presented at a public
hearing held August 7 in Fayetteville.'" Untitled, UPI, Nov. 6, 1985, available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, Omni File.
160. At a news conference, former Congressman Ed Edmondson, STIR's attorney, said that
the group will "'pursue this to the Supreme Court if necessary.' " River Supporters Vow
Continued Sewage Fight, UPI, Feb. 11, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
161. Section 1341(a)(2) provides that if within 60 days of receiving notification that a
discharge may affect the waters of an affected state, such state "notifies the Administrator and
the licensing or permitting agency in writing of its objection to the issuance of such license or
permit and requests a public hearing on such objection, the licensing or permitting agency
shall hold such a hearing." 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
162. The issue of whether EPA correctly considered all relevant factors in making its
determination involves administrative law issues beyond the scope of this paper.
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standards of affected downstream states. 16 3
The ALJ found that the discharges authorized in the permit
would not violate the more stringent water quality standards of
Oklahoma, 64 implicitly assuming that the Clean Water Act demands
that upstream source states abide by the more stringent water quality
standards of affected downstream states.' 65 Both Oklahoma and
Arkansas appealed the ALJ's decision to the chief judicial officer
("CJO").166 Arkansas argued that the ALJ's decision was erroneous
because it presumed that Arkansas must abide by the more stringent
water quality standards of Oklahoma, while Oklahoma pleaded that,
contrary to the ALJ's conclusion, the permit would make it impossi67
ble for Oklahoma to attain its own water quality standards.
The CJO affirmed in part and reversed in part. 1 6 The order indicated that Arkansas must abide by the EPA-approved Oklahoma
water quality standards and remanded the case to determine
"whether the record showed by a preponderance of the evidence that
the permitted discharge would not cause an actual detectable viola' 69
tion of [Oklahoma's] water quality standards."'
On remand, the ALJ reviewed the record and once again concluded that "an out-of-state source must meet the ]water quality standards] of another downriver state. . . . Therefore the Fayetteville
discharge must meet Oklahoma's [water quality standards] as they
exist at the border of the two states."' 7 0 The ALJ justified its conclusion by stating that "[a]ny other interpretation would allow a source
state to locate its discharge just across the line in Arkansas and freely
violate Oklahoma standards. . . . Such a result is contrary to the
[Clean Water Act] regulations and Court decisions."' 7' Both parties
163. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir. 1990).
164. Id.
165. The ALJ found support in the following three EPA regulations: (1) 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.4(D) (1989) ("No permit may be issued... [w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot
ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected states");
(2) 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(4) (1989) ("each NPDES permit shall include conditions meeting
any requirements in addition to or more stringent than promulgated effluent limitations
guidelines or standards under [the] Clean Water Act"); (3) 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(b) (1989) ("In
designating uses of a water body and the appropriate criteria for those uses, the State shall take
into consideration the water quality Standards of downstream waters and shall ensure that its
water quality standards provide for the attainment and maintenance of the water quality
standards of downstream waters.").
166. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 597.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 603 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
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appealed once more to the CJO.
On final remand, the CJO affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that the
permit would not violate Oklahoma water quality standards.17 2 Thus,
despite continued strenuous objections raised by Oklahoma, the EPA
issued an NPDES permit to the Fayetteville water treatment plant.
Both States appealed the CJO's decision once more, and the case
173
ultimately reached the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Again, both parties made the same arguments that they had previously made on appeal from the ALJ's two prior findings. Namely,
Arkansas maintained that "nowhere in the Clean Water Act did Congress authorize affected states such as Oklahoma to impose their
74
water quality standards upon a discharger in another state."'
Oklahoma, on the other hand, agreed with the ALJ's finding concerning the applicability of its water quality standards to an Arkansas discharger,' 7 5 but contended that, in reviewing earlier findings of the
dispute, the ALJ and the CJO erred in concluding that the permit
would not violate Oklahoma's water quality standards. 76 The primary statutory interpretation issue on appeal therefore, as framed by
the Tenth Circuit, was "whether the Clean Water Act requires that
any discharge permitted under 33 U.S.C. § 1342 comply with all
applicable water quality standards, including the EPA-approved regulations of any affected downstream state."' 7 7 The resolution of this
issue was important because it was case of first impression that could
potentially allow the regulation of out-of-state sources by affected
7
states. 1
172. Id. at 597.

173. Appeal of an Administrative decision is directed to the circuit courts of appeal by
Clean Water Act section 1369(b)(1), which provides as follows:
Review of the Administrator's action ... in issuing or denying any permit under
section 1342 of this title ... may be had by any interested person in the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which
such person resides or transacts business which is directly affected by such action
upon application by such person.
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1988).
174. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 597, 602 (10th Cir. 1990). The State of Arkansas
continued to claim that the Clean Water Act did not authorize EPA to compel upstream

source state to abide by the more stringent water quality standards of affected downstream
states.
175. The State of Oklahoma agreed with EPA's application of the downstream water
quality standards to upstream dischargers, but alleged that the permit should be denied
because the Fayetteville discharge would in fact violate Oklahoma's more stringent water

quality standards.
176. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 617-29.
177. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
178. Although the same issue reached a court of appeals in Champion Int'l Corp. v. EPA,
850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988), the Fourth Circuit never reached the merits of the case because it
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After considering the deferential standards of review, the Tenth
Circuit held that "the Clean Water Act requires point sources to comply with the federally approved water quality standards of affected
downstream states."' 79 Thus, after such intense debate in the
Supreme Court surrounding the issue of the extrajurisdictional effect
of a state's nuisance laws, this court's opinion indirectly vindicates the
preexisting states' rights which were curtailed in the earlier Supreme
Court decisions. 8 0 The following sections examine how the court
arrived at this conclusion and its possible repercussions.
B. Analysis
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit divided its analysis
into three sections: (1) purpose of the Clean Water Act; (2) Supreme
Court interstate pollution precedent after the enactment of the Clean

Water Act; and (3) specific Clean Water Act provisions. This threestep statutory analysis led the court to conclude that, if required by

the EPA, an upstream state must comply with the more8 stringent
water quality standards of an affected downstream state.' '

1.

PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

The first step in the court's analysis was to decipher the general
purpose of the Clean Water Act. 82 To this end, the court focused on
section 1311 (b)(1)(C) of the Act, which in pertinent part provides:
"In order to carry out the objective of this chapter there shall be
achieved ... not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to
any State law or regulations .... 83 Furthermore, the court reasoned that section 1342 requires that "any NPDES permit issued
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Champion International,the State of
North Carolina proposed issuing a permit to a discharger without taking into consideration
the water quality standards of Tennessee, the affected downstream state. The Fourth Circuit
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State of North Carolina had neither issued nor
denied a permit as of the date of the appeal. Id. at 190.
179. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 634. The court's holding was unnecessarily expansive
because it was not necessary to hold that the Clean Water Act requiredthat all upstream states
abide by the water quality standards of all affected downstream states. The court could have
limited its holding to the facts by narrowly concluding that, as an administrative law issue, the
Administrator's decision was reasonable.
180. E.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois (Milwaukee If), 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see also supra notes 107-48 and accompanying
text.
181. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 634-35.
182. Id. at 604-07.
183. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(C) (1988). The objective of the Clean Water Act is explicitly
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under the Act contain terms adequate to insure compliance with [section 1311]."'"" The court rejected arguments presented by Arkansas
that section 1370 limits the reach of any stricter standard to discharges originating within the state imposing those standards."' 5 The
court rejected this contention for three reasons. First, the court found
that section 1370 is a "'savings clause' that merely preserves the preexisting right of the states to set more restrictive standards than those
imposed by [the Clean Water Act]" and not a restrictive clause, as
Arkansas claimed. 8 6 In addition, the court concluded that Congress
could not have intended to limit the scope of section 1311, which is
"one of the CWA's crucial provisions." 117
The second flaw the court found with Arkansas' interpretation of
0
section 137Q1

is that the "waters ...of such state" language in that

section only refers to the second subsection, which in turn only
addresses the rights and jurisdiction of states but does not refer to the
pollution regulation authority addressed in subsection one. 8 9 The
court read the two phrases of section 1370 independently, thus interpreting section 1370(1) as merely affording regulatory authority to the
states, while interpreting section 1370(2) as limiting the right and
jurisdiction of states to waters within their borders. In this case,
where the issue involved pollution regulation, the court found section
1370(2) inapplicable. Therefore, according to the court, the only
applicable language in that section is section 1370(1), which grants
state authority instead of restricting it.
stated in section 1251, which provides, "The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Id. § 1251(a) (1988).
184. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 605.
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Section 1370 states in pertinent part:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall
(1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or
interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting
discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement
of pollution; except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent
standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in
effect under this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency
may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent
standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which
is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance under this
chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters)
of such States.
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
189. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 605-06.
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According to the court, the third weakness in Arkansas' argument was its "irrational" interpretation of section 1311.19° Given the
fact that section 1311 calls for the imposition of "more stringent limitations, including those necessary to meet water quality standards,"''
the court found it irrational to interpret section 1370 as a restrictive
provision because without the imposition of the more stringent
affected state's water quality standards, it would be impossible 1in
92
many circumstances to meet downstream water quality standards.
Moreover, the court agreed with the EPA and concluded that Arkansas' interpretation of section 1370 would create a lack of uniformity
that would encourage "pollution shopping,"' 93 allowing dischargers
to locate themselves in states with the most lenient water quality standards. The court therefore concluded that the effect of Arkansas'
interpretation of section 1370 would be inconsistent with Congress'
intent of "restor[ing] the chemical, physical and biological integrity of
94

the Nation's waters."'1

2.

SUPREME COURT INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION CASES
DECIDED AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972: MILWAUKEE ii
AND OUELLETTE

The second step in the Tenth Circuit Court's analysis of the
Clean Water Act was to examine the two interstate water pollution
cases decided by the Supreme Court after the Amendments of 1972:
Milwaukee 11195 and Ouellette.' 96 In both of these cases the plaintiff
brought a nuisance action under common law seeking to enjoin the
source state discharge. 197 The Tenth Circuit declared these cases
190. Id. at 606.
191. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(C) (1988).
192. Id. The court stated:
In order to ensure that the EPA-approved water quality standards in all states
are "met" or "implemented," it is "necessary" to require dischargers to meet the
applicable requirements of other affected states as well as those of the source
state. There could be no assurance of achieving a state's more stringent WQS if
an upstream, out-of-state discharger were not required to comply with those
standards.
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 606.
193. Id. ("Moreover, rewarding sources for locating in states with less stringent water
quality requirements (by relieving them from complying with more stringent downstream
water quality standards) would also result in 'pollution shopping,' contrary to Congress's
intent in passing the 1972 CWA amendments.").
194. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
195. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee If), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
196. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
197. Milwaukee II involved the application of federal common law, whereas Ouellette
involved the application of the affected state's common law. In its attempt to distinguish the
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inapplicable because they involved common law nuisance actions in
lieu of statutory actions under the Clean Water Act.' 9"
Nonetheless, the court did examine certain dicta in Ouellette that
supported Arkansas' position. 199 Notably, the court acknowledged
the Supreme Court's conclusion in Ouellette that "an affected state
only has an advisory role" in regulating pollution that originates
beyond its borders.2" However, the Tenth Circuit's answer to this
contention was that "it is beyond dispute that [the language] is dicta
and not controlling here.' '201 The court distinguished Ouellette by
stating that case concerned the application of state common law, 20 2
whereas the case at bar concerned "federally approved water quality
standards. ' 2°3 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit further distinguished
Ouellette by analogizing the attempt in that case to establishing a second permit system, which the Supreme Court held is barred by section 1342(b). 2°
3. CLEAN WATER ACT PROVISIONS
The third step in the court's analysis of the Clean Water Act
involved the examination of three sections that the court found to be
supportive of the EPA's application of state water quality standards
to out-of-state sources: section 1341, section 1342, and section
1365.205

a. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2)
The court found section 1341 especially persuasive because it
provides a hearing for an affected state's objections to the issuance of
an NPDES permit.20 6 The court concluded that "the purposes of this
provision must be to enable affected states to ensure that their water
case at bar from these previous cases, the Tenth Circuit erroneously stated that in both
Milwaukee II and Ouellette "an affected state was seeking to enjoin an ongoing discharge in
another state by resort to its own state law nuisance remedies." Oklahoma, 595 F.2d at 607.
While Ouellette dealt with state common law, Milwaukee II involved federal common law.
"Illinois filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, seeking abatement, under federal common law, of the public nuisance petitioners were
allegedly creating by their discharges." Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
198. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 607 (10th Cir. 1990).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 608.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487, 494 (1981)).
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491, 496-97).
205. Id. at 609-15.
206. Section 1341(a)(2) provides that upon written request by an affected state, the licensing
or permitting agency shall hold a hearing. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
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quality will not be jeopardized by a discharge in another state, ' 20 '
refuting Arkansas' interpretation of "applicable water quality standards" as referring only to the standards of he source state. In addition, the court found that the passage, "violat[ing] any water quality
requirement in such state, ' 20 8 referred to the water quality standards
of the affected state, and thus the clause "applicable water quality
requirement" similarly referred to the water quality of the affected
state. 2o9
The court also drew upon the legislative history of section 1341.
It found special strength in statements by the Senate committee which
explained that "it is reasonable to require that Federal permits and
licenses should take into account State water quality plans, standards
and requirements adopted under section 303 [1313] to assure maintenance of water quality in the respective states. ' 210° Because Congress
did not draw a distinction between source state and affected state
water quality standards, the court agreed with the EPA and conmust comply with all
cluded that "sources subject to NPDES permits
21
1
standards.'
quality
water
state
approved
b.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)

The second Clean Water Act provision that the court found supportive of the EPA's application of the downstream state's water
quality standards is section 1342, which grants the Administrator
veto power over permits issued by state permitting agencies. 212 That
section specifies that the Administrator may object to the issuance of
an NPDES permit on the grounds: (1) that a permitting state failed
to accept recommendations from another state whose waters may be
affected by the permit issuance, or (2) that the permit is "outside [i.e.,
'2 13
inconsistent with] the guidelines and requirements of the Act."
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 610 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id. (emphasis added); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 610.
Id. at 610-11 (quoting S. CONF. REP. No. 830, at 96, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4424, 4398).
211. Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
212. Section 1342(d)(1) provides: "Each State shall transmit to the Administrator a copy of
each permit application received by such State and provide notice to the Administrator of
every action related to the consideration of such permit application, including each permit
proposed to be issued by such State." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1) (1988).
213. Section 1342(d)(2) states in pertinent part:
No permit shall issue (A) if the Administrator within ninety days of the date of
his notification.., objects in writing to the issuance of such permit, or (B) if the
Administrator within ninety days of the date of transmittal of the proposed
permit by the State objects in writing to the issuance of the permit as being
outside the guidelines and requirements of this chapter.
207.
208.
209.
210.
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Thus, the court concluded that section 1342 supports the EPA's construction of the Act.21 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court firmly rejected Arkansas'
argument that the clear language of the Act limits the affected state to
an "advisory role."' 2 15 The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument for
two additional reasons. First, section 1342(b)(5) did not preclude
obligatory compliance with the affected state's water quality standards.21 6 The court saw section 1342 as a procedural provision rather
than a substantive one. In essence, the court found that the provision
delineated the steps for communication between the source state and
the affected state without touching upon the affected state's power for
compelling compliance with its water quality standards. Second, the
court stated that Arkansas' interpretation failed because it focused
solely on section 1342(b)(5) without considering the Clean Water Act
in its entirety.21 7 In addition to the requirements in subsection (b)(5),
a state permitting agency must meet other fundamental requirements,
such as insuring permit compliance. 2'8 Since subsection (b)(5) is
included among these types of requirements, the court concluded that
subsection (b)(5) is not merely discretionary but obligatory as well.2" 9
At the end of the court's examination of section 1341, it agreed with
the EPA and found that this section supported the imposition of an
affected state's water quality standards upon dischargers located in an
upstream source state.2 2 °
c.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(h)

The third provision of the Clean Water Act that in the court's
opinion supported the EPA's statutory interpretation was section
Id. § 1342(d)(2).
214. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 611-13 (10th Cir. 1990).
215. Id. at 612.
216. Section 1342(b)(5) provides in pertinent parts:
[T]he Administrator shall approve each submitted (State permit] program unless
he determines that adequate authority does not exist:
(5) To insure that any State (other than the permitting state), whose
waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written
recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to
any permit application and, if any part of such written recommendations are not
accepted by the permitting State, that the permitting State will notify such
affected State (and the Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such
recommendations together with the reasons for so doing.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
217.
218.
219.
220.

Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 612.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (1988).
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 612.
Id.
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1365, which allows a state governor to sue the EPA to enforce an
effluent limitation.221 The court determined that this section provides
a remedy for violations not of the source state's own effluent limitations, but rather the affected state's water quality standards.222 In so
concluding, the court disapproved of Arkansas' interpretation of the
section, which would only allow a state governor to sue the EPA to
enforce the effluent limitations of the source state.223 The court took
the position that "effluent limitations are not an end in themselves,
but simply a means to an end-the desired water quality," 22 4 and thus
the governor of the affected state sue the EPA to enforce the state's
water quality standards in accordance with section 1365(h).
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit held that, taken as a whole, the
purpose of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court interstate pollution precedents, and key provisions of the Clean Water Act justify the
EPA's construction of the Act. 225 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
cleared the way in favor of affected States by allowing the EPA to
compel upstream state dischargers to abide by the more stringent
water quality standards of the affected downstream states.
C. Critique
The main analytical weakness of the Tenth Circuit decision
stems from its use of the Clean Water Act's inconclusive text and
limited legislative history to conclude that Congress intended imposing downstream water quality standards on upstream dischargers.
The proof of such intent is necessary for the court to justify imposing
such a radical intrusion into the rights of other states who also have
EPA-approved water quality standards.226 The following section
examines the legislative history of sections 1370, 1311(b)(1)(C),
1341(a)(2), 1342(b), 1342(d) and 1365 which are relevant to the analysis and conclusion reached by the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v.
221. Section 1365(h) provides:
A Governor of a State may commence a civil action ... where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to enforce an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter the violation of which is occurring in another State and is causing an

adverse effect on the public health or welfare in his State, or is causing the
violation of any water quality standard in his State.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988).
222. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 614 (10th Cir. 1990).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 615.
226. Under the Clean Water Act, all states must have their own water quality standards,
whether they be the ones established by EPA or more stringent ones established by the state's

legislature or permitting agency.
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EPA. This section also considers the decision's impact on the sovereignty of upstream states.
1.

THE TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT

The Tenth Circuit construed the language in section 1370 of the

Clean Water Act 22 7 as merely preserving the right of states to impose

more stringent water quality standards than the minimum required
under the Act without interference by the EPA. 228 The court rejected
Arkansas' argument that section 1370 "limits the 'reach' of any
stricter standards to discharges originating within the state imposing
those standards. '229 The plain language of the section, however, may
frustrate the court's holding, for it limits the jurisdiction of the states
to impose stricter water quality standards upon the "waters
230
such States.

. .

. of

In its analysis of section 1311(b)( 1)(c), 231 the court focused on
the language which calls for more stringent limitations "necessary to
meet water quality standards" established pursuant to state law.2 32

From this interpretation, the court concluded that section
1311 (b)(1)(c) requires that an upstream discharger meet the standards
established by a downstream state. The court may have overextended
the meaning of this section, for its language is far from clear. For
example, the section may be merely a "timing provision. "233 More227. Section 1370 provides in pertinent part: "Except as expressly provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall... be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right
or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such
States." 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
228. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 605 (10th Cir. 1990). In the Report from the
Conference Committee, Senator Muskie stated that "[s]ection 510 [1370] provides that States,
political subdivisions and interstate agencies retain the right to set more restrictive standards
than those imposed under this Act." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT,
supra note 63, at 331.
229. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 605.
230. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2) (1988).
231. Section 1311 (b)(1)(c) states, in pertinent part:
In order to carry out the objective of this chapter there shall be achieved not later
than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to
meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance,
established pursuant to any State law or regulations (under authority preserved
by section 1370 of this title) or any other Federal law or regulation, or required
to implement any applicable water quality standard established pursuant to this
chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) (1988).
232. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 606 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)).
233. In its brief, Arkansas wrote: "That section [1311(b)(1)(c)] actually provides only a
timetable in which states that wish to establish more stringent water quality standards for
waters within their state must establish such regulations." Brief for Appellants/Petitioners at
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over, the passive voice used throughout the section leaves it to anyone's guess whose water quality standards are to be met.234 It also
fails to specify which state should abide by the more stringent limitations-the state imposing the limitation or all other states?
The Clean Water Act provisions that cast most doubt upon the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Oklahoma v. EPA are those limiting the
role of affected states.2 35 According to sections 1341(a)(2) 236 and
1342(b),237 an affected state only receives notification of a permit
application where the proposed discharge "may affect, as determined
by the Administrator [of the EPA], the quality of [its] waters"; 23 following this, the state can object to the issuance of the permit,239
receive a hearing before the Administrator, and make recommendations to the source state. 240 The fact that Congress fashioned such a
specific mechanism for an affected state to voice its disagreement indi34, Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9516) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter Arkansas Brief].
234. Section 131 l(b)(l)(c) refers only to "more stringent limitation ... establishedpursuant
to any state law or regulations." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(c) (1988). For the complete text of
section 131 l(b)(1)(c), see supra note 231.
235. Construing the Clean Water Act in Ouellette, the Supreme Court described the
affected states as having a mere "advisory role in regulating pollution that originates beyond its
borders." International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987).
236. Section 1341(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever such a discharge may affect, as determined by the Administrator [of
EPA], the quality of the waters of any other State, the Administrator within
thirty days of the date of notice of application for such Federal license or permit
shall so notify such other State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the
applicant. If, within sixty days after the receipt of such notification, such other
State determines that such discharge will affect the quality of its waters so as to
violate any water quality requirements in such State, the licensing or permitting
agency shall hold such a hearing. Such agency shall condition such license or
permit in such manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable
water quality requirements.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
237. Section 1342(b) outlines the requirements for the state permit programs. The section
requires the Administrator to approve each submitted program unless he determines that
adequate authority within the program does not exist. Under subsection (5), the
Administrator must determine that adequate authority exists
[t]o insure that any State (other than the permitting State), whose waters may be
affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to the
permitting State (and the Administrator) with respect to any permit application
and, if any part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the
permitting State, that the permitting State will notify such affected State (and the
Administrator) in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations
together with its reasons for so doing.
Id. § 1342(b)(5).
238. Id. § 1341(a)(2) (emphasis added).
239, Id.
240, Id. § 1342(b)(5).
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cates that it is the exclusive form of relief for affected- states under the
Act. Had Congress intended for all upstream states to automatically
abide by the water quality standards of the affected downstream
" '
states, it would not have included a provision for a hearing.24
Affected states would not need to argue before the Administrator,
who would automatically know that the upstream state must comply
with the water quality standards of the states downstream. Instead,
the inquiry would focus on whether the water quality standards of
downstream states were in fact violated.
The discretionary power of the EPA's Administrator also indicates that Congress did not intend for all upstream states to abide by
the water quality standards of all affected downstream states. The
Administrator not only has the power to deny the issuance of a state's
discharge permit,242 but also can waive this veto power at his own
discretion.243 Had Congress intended for upstream states to comply
with the water quality standards of those affected downstream, it
would have made the Administrator's veto mandatory.
The court also justified its interpretation of the Clean Water Act
under language in section 1365(h), 2 " stating that it authorizes the
governor of a state to sue the EPA "where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to enforce an 'effluent standard under this chapter'
the violation of which is occurring in another state and is 'causing a
violation of any water quality requirement in his state.' "245 The
court considered this to be a remedy for the impact of pollution on the
affected state.2 46 However, the court overlooked the section's requirement that the violation occur "inanother State." Under an alterna241. In addition, Arkansas emphasized Congress' failure to provide affected states with a
more active role by arguing that "Congress could have expressly said in Section 1342(b)(5)
that states to whom the permitting process has been delegated must have the ability to comply
with affected state water quality standards. Congress did not so choose." Arkansas Brief,
supra note 233, at 38.

242. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1988).
243. "The Administrator may, as to any permit application, waive paragraph (2) of this
subsection." Id. § 1342(d)(3).
244. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595,'614 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h)

(1988)). Section 1365(h) in pertinent part provides:
A Governor of a State may commence a civil action against the Administrator
where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to enforce an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter the violation of which is occurring in
another State and is causing an adverse effect on the public health or welfare in

his State, or is causing a violation of any water quality requirement in his State.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1988).
245. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 614 (emphasis added).
246. Id. ("Clearly, the injury sustained by a state for which § 1365 provides a remedy is the
impact on that state's water quality, not the violation of the 'effluent standard or limitation' per
se.").
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tive interpretation of this language, section 1365(h) merely provides a
means for downstream governors to demand that upstream states
enforce compliance with their own state permits.
The legislative history of section 1365(h) casts further doubt
upon the Tenth Circuit's holding. For instance, Senator Muskie,
expressing the Senate's interpretation of section 1365(h), noted that
this section allows a governor to "initiate an action against the
Administrator for an alleged failure to abate pollution in anotherstate
that adversely affects the Governor's state. ' 247 Senator Muskie's
explanation indicates that governors can only bring actions to
demand that source states enforce their own permit requirements. By
amplifying the silence and ambiguity of the Clean Water Act concerning interstate pollution, the Tenth Circuit shifted the balance in favor
of affected downstream states.
The court's position also sharply contradicts congressional intent
as expressed by Representative Jones from Alabama, who indicated
that the permit program "places the primary responsibility for
administering the water pollution control program within the separate
States. ' 248 This language indicates that the Clean Water Act was
intended to respect the rights of states. Congress did not intend to
establish a uniform federal regulatory program, but rather announced
a federal objective to be administered by the "separate states."
Even more questionable is the Tenth Circuit's expansive conclusion that Oklahoma's EPA-approved water quality standards are federal law, and thus applicable to upstream source states. 249 The court
equated "federally-approvedstate water quality standards" to "federal
water quality standards" 2 0 in an effort to harmonize its holding with
that of the Supreme Court in Ouellette, which did not allow the application of an affected downstream State's common law to an interstate
247.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT,

supra note 63, at 328.

248. Id. at 359.
249. In a footnote, the court summarily concluded that "[tihe Fayetteville plant has been
required by EPA to observe federal law, i.e., Oklahoma's EPA-approved water quality
standards. . . . Accordingly, throughout this opinion we use 'applicable water quality
standards' to mean EPA-approved water quality standards that govern the affected waters."
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 602 n.5. The court carefully focused on "federally approved

water quality requirements of affected states," and stated that it would "draw no conclusions
about state requirements that may not have been approved by the EPA." Id. at 616 n.28.
Despite such rhetoric, the effect of its holding is that state-promulgated standards, upon review
of the agency, would have to be considered federal law.
250. In another footnote, the court stated that "it is misleading to say 'Oklahoma . . .
impose[d its] water quality standards' on Arkansas .... The 1982 Oklahoma water quality
standards, which EPA judged applicable to the Fayetteville plant, had been approved by
EPA." Id. at 602 n.5 (citation omitted).
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water pollution controversy. 2 5 ' However, this construction conflicts
with the apparent intent of the legislature. Congress distinguished
state water quality standards from federal ones. For example, the
House of Representatives' summary of the Clean Water Act referred
to more stringent state requirements "than those required under Federal law." 25 2 This indicates that Congress did not consider state water
quality standards federal law. Moreover, the definition of "applicable
standards" found in the legislative history makes no mention of the
imposition of an affected state's water quality standards beyond its
own jurisdiction. The Report by the House Committee on Public
Works defined "applicable standards" as those requirements which
are "pertinent and apply to the activity" and those which were in
"existence by having been promulgated or implemented. ' 25 3 This definition helps little because it employs the synonymous and equally
ambiguous term, "pertinent." The true question does not depend on
the definition of "applicable," but rather on which standards should
apply.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit's incorporation of state water quality
standards into federal law re-ignites the conflicting interests of the
states that the Supreme Court defused in Ouellette. If Oklahoma's
water quality standards are incorporated into federal law, by implication the water quality standards of every state are part of federal law.
Carrying the Tenth Circuit's position further, the water quality standards of each of the fifty states would have to be treated as federal
law, and thus apply to every other affected state. Since each state's
water quality standards would be considered federal law, the court's
reasoning begs the question of which "federal law" should prevail
when any conflict exists. Moreover, if indeed a state's EPA-approved
water quality standards are federal law, then it should apply across
the country. Such an absurd result would wholly frustrate the Clean
Water Act's goal of efficiently allocating water resources. Considering the language and the legislative history of the Act's sections cited
by the Tenth Circuit in support of its subordination of upstream
states' interests, the decision seems hasty and ill-founded.
251. By incorporating state water quality standards into the federal scheme itself, the Tenth
Circuit masked the tension between the states' objectives and federal goals of "efficiency and
predictability." International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987); see also supra
notes 138-145 (discussing Ouellette and federal pre-emption).
252. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 63, at 404.
253. Id. at 808.
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POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE OKLAHOMA
v. EPA DECISION

The expansive vision of the Clean Water Act announced by the
Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v. EPA ignores the inevitable effects of
automatically applying the downstream state's more stringent standard in interstate water pollution conflicts.25 4 The court's construction excessively infringes upon the upstream state's environmental
and economic policies.255 Upstream states would be forced to consider the interests of downstream states, whereas downstream states
could enact water quality standards essentially without regard to the
effect of their cost upon their upstream counterparts.25 6 Conflicts
inevitably arise as source states realize that affected states can force
compliance with their more stringent water quality standards, regardless of whether those standards are unreasonably stringent.
254. See supra notes 199-219 and accompanying text. One editorial written soon after the
Tenth Circuit's decision criticized it as follows:
Sometimes a court hands down a decision that seems perfectly logical but causes
havoc. A federal appeals panel has done that in a precedent-setting ruling
involving the interstate discharge of wastewater treatment plant effluent.
* . . Whatever the legal fine points, there seems to be a violation of the
concept of equity and common sense.
... We cannot challenge a ruling by a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals based
on its reading of the law, federal regulations and the facts of the case. But
obviously some corrections must be made legislatively or administratively to
prevent this decision from causing either chaos or a long search for multistate
cooperation.
Don't Start Waste Wars... or Water Wars, ENGINEERING NEws-REC., Aug. 23, 1990, at 66.
255. The State of Arkansas argued that one adverse effect from deferring to the downstream
state's standard would be that upstream states could find it impossible to predict which state's
water quality standards to obey. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 606-07 (10th Cir. 1990).
The court responded that the "EPA approval of state WQS determines the potentially
applicable rules," and "computer modeling can predict the extent of a new source's potential
impact." Id. at 607.
This response was not acceptable to Arkansas, which illustrated the impracticability of
requiring upstream states to abide by the more stringent water quality standards of
downstream states with the following example:
A permit for a discharger in Minnesota on the Mississippi River issued in
compliance with Minnesota water quality standards and EPA regulations would
be subject to challenges under the Clean Water Act from the nine states
downstream from the point of discharge. Permits issued for dischargers in
Colorado, the state in which the headwaters for a number of major interstate
waterways originate, may be challenged by any number of states through which
the waterways flow.
Arkansas Brief, supra note 233, at 46.
256. Cf. J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 339 (1971) (discussing the need
for federal intervention to regulate external costs of air pollution among the states).
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Imposition of Exceedingly Stringent Water Quality Standards
by Downstream States

Perhaps the most perplexing result of Oklahoma v. EPA's expansive holding is that downstream states can unilaterally impose their
more stringent water quality standards upon upstream states. At first
blush, this requirement seems like a good step towards serious interstate water pollution abatement, assuming that states would rationally
and fairly consider their upstream counterpart's needs when setting
more stringent water quality standards than those required under the
Clean Water Act. But downstream states, pressured by a myriad of
economic and social pressures, may not always react in such an admirable fashion. For instance, a downstream state could, in a retaliatory
gesture against an upstream state, set unreasonably stringent water
quality standards that would effectively curb the discharging activities
only of the upstream state, because the downstream state's discharging needs might be relatively low 25 7 for that particular pollutant.
To resolve the conflict between the two states' standards, the
courts must assign one a higher priority. The upstream state would
argue that the scheme outlined in section 1370 of the Clean Water
Act gives states complete control over their water quality standards,
absent the requirements of the Act itself.25 8 This control would be
illusory if the state's water quality standards were replaced by the
more stringent water quality standards of the affected downstream
states. However, the downstream state could also make a similar
"complete control" argument, claiming that its own control over
water quality standards would become illusory if other states dictated
them. Under the Tenth Circuit's expansive reading of the Clean
257. See, e.g., Court Halts Plant'sDischarge, ENGINEERING NEws-REC., Aug. 23, 1990, at
8 (reporting that after the decision of the Tenth Circuit, "some Arkansas politicians were
suggesting that the state retaliate by toughening pollution rules on rivers flowing from

Oklahoma into Arkansas").
258. Section 1370 states in pertinent part:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall

(1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or
interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting
discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control of abatement
of pollution; except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent
standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in

effect under this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency
may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent
standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which
is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance under this
chapter.

33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
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Water Act, the more stringent water quality standards would have
automatic priority. This possibility, however, would be unreasonable
by virtue of its inherent arbitrariness. Furthermore, the court's decision gives the states legal authority to "do indirectly what they could
'
not do directly-regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources." 259
b.

Control over Another Sovereign State's Industrial Economy

Because of the socioeconomic issues intertwined with the use of
water resources, the Tenth Circuit's infringement upon states' rights
would not be limited to the area of environmental regulation. Ideally,
a state allocates its resources, including its water quality by striking a
balance between the "secured" benefits derived from industry and the
"speculative" benefits it would derive from protective environmental
regulation. 2 ° In making the important decision of resource allocation, states focus on the preferences of its citizens: a state that is heavily dependent upon industry values the needs of its citizenry for jobs
and revenue higher than its need for more stringent environmental
regulation. 26' The Tenth Circuit frustrates the state's ability to meet
the needs of its citizens by imposing the additional constraint of
downstream states' quality standards. If the holding in Oklahoma v.
EPA were to become the federal standard, it would place the industries and economies of upstream states at the mercy of downstream
state policies.2 62
c.

Excessive EPA Power

In future cases the Tenth Circuit may attempt to limit its holding
by concluding only that the EPA has the power to prohibit discharges
that violate the reasonable water quality standards of an affected
downstream state. Even this grant of power is subject to criticism.
Compounded by the substantial deference exercised by courts toward
259. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987).
260. The benefits that a community derives from industry are often erroneously perceived
as real and secure because they take the shape of jobs and revenues. The benefits derived from
environmental regulation, however, are often neither as tangible nor as immediate.
261. See Zerbe, supra note 14, at 196-97 (arguing that local preferences will prescribe
environmental standards).
262. The excessive power that the Tenth Circuit's holding gives to EPA and to downstream
states could have serious constitutional repercussions. According to this court's decision,
downstream states will not only have the right to dictate the environmental regulations of
upstream states, but will also be able to dictate the socioeconomic policies of those states.
This problem applies not only to water pollution, but also to air pollution. In fact, one
commentator noted that compelling a source state to abide by the environmental standards of
affected states would effectively allow one state to control the industries of several neighboring
... states." Smith, Playing the Acid Rain Game: A State's Remedies, 16 ENVTL. L. 255, 301
(1986).
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the administering agency's interpretation of a statute, the EPA's
power could prove to be excessive.263 The EPA could effectively dictate the social and economic policies of states, without properly considering the benefits and burdens that each would derive from the
more stringent water quality standards. Considering the complexity
of interstate water pollution disputes, such judgments should not be
made by a regulatory agency but should be in the hands of the courts
under the common law doctrine of public nuisance.
VI.

THE INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO ABATE
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION EFFECTIVELY AND
EQUITABLY

A.

The Clean Water Act Is Inadequate to Abate
Interstate Water Pollution

The Tenth Circuit's blanket conclusion that "the Clean Water
Act requires point sources to comply with the federally approved
water quality standards of affected downstream states ' 264 reveals the
inadequacy of the Act in solving interstate water pollution
problems. 265 The Act relays ambiguous and contradictory messages
that foster conflicts between states. At the core of this inadequacy lies
the inherent contradiction between the statute's general policy of pollution abatement and its multiple open-ended provisions concerning
the subject of interstate water pollution.
For instance, Congress declared an unequivocal policy for the
Clean Water Act when it provided that "[t]he objective of this chapter
is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is
hereby declared that ... it is the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985. ' ' 266 Nevertheless, the sections of the statute that address interstate disputes
severely limit the efficacy of this goal.
263. For example, the Tenth Circuit noted that "where the statute is ambiguous, EPA's
construction, as that of the agency charged with administering the statute, is entitled to
substantial deference." Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1988)).
264. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 634.
265. See, e.g., Crider, supra note 27, at 644 (courts have interpreted the Clean Water Act as
referring to a state's right to control only those discharges located within its borders);
Glicksman, FederalPreemption and PrivateLegal Remediesfor Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
121, 209-10 (1985) (concluding that the Clean Water Act denies state autonomy and,
derivatively, the rights of the state's citizens); Comment, supra note 25 (arguing that the Clean
Water Act is not and never was intended to be all-encompassing).
266. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
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Despite the Act's provision that requires source states to consider the recommendations of an affected state, the Administrator has
the discretion to allow the source state to ignore any objections.2 67

This power implicitly condones the violation of an affected state's
water quality standards.268 Such discretionary review is insidious
because it renders the Administrator's "duty" illusory and generates a
source for future interstate water pollution disputes.
In addition, the vague language of the Clean Water Act prevents
states from enforcing more stringent water quality standards, and
thus it serves as an obstacle to effective water pollution abatement.269
The water quality provisions require compliance only with a minimum federal standard 27 1 without mentioning any upper limits.27'
Thus, so long as the source state abides by the federal minimummost likely to be the least common denominator 2' 2 - it is safe from
reproach. As a result, the system effectively rewards polluters for
eschewing more stringent state standards by operating in least denominator states.2 73 Such "pollution shoppers" use the Act itself as a
shield against more protective environmental regulations.
By allowing the states to independently set their water quality
standards, the Act also reveals its insensitivity towards state economic
considerations. Pollution shopping tends to place a more environmentally protective state at an economic disadvantage vis-a-vis a state
that merely requires compliance with the federal minimum. The Act
does not recognize that a state is susceptible to pressure from the
workers who depend on the regulated industry for their livelihood.
Without a more clearly defined mechanism for establishing standards of pollution control and water quality, the Clean Water Act will
continue to prevent effective, progressive abatement of interstate
water pollution. The result may be an unreasonable stringent interstate water pollution abatement scheme, like the one imposed by the
Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v. EPA.
267. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
268. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3) (1988); see also supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text
(describing Administrator's discretion).
269. "Similar provisions in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act . . . have been
interpreted by the courts to refer only 'to the right of a state with respect to discharges within
the state,' and not to a state's right to impose its more stringent limitations upon polluters in
other states." Crider, supra note 27, at 644 (citations omitted).
270. Stewart, supra note 27, at 260.
271. Considering the complexity of problems which may arise in setting up water quality
standards for different localities within and between states, one cannot help but hypothesize

that the omission may indeed be deliberate.
272. The term "least common denominator" describes the water quality standard that is
least strict (or, equivalently, most lenient).
273. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 606 (10th Cir. 1990).
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FederalLegislation Is Inherently Inadequate to Abate Interstate
Water Pollution

Even with more clearly defined water quality standards, federal
legislation may still be unable either to achieve significant water pollution abatement or to address local interests. Federal interstate environmental legislation inevitably thwarts local self-determination and
generates burdens that are, or at least appear to be, unjustified in particular localities. 274 For example, consider a national statute setting
high uniform levels of effluent limitations. A state whose chief industry discharges the regulated pollutant would consider itself unfairly
singled out. Moreover, the burden imposed on this state would be
relatively greater than that imposed on states less dependent on such
industry. The result is that detrimentally affected states would bear
the brunt of the regulation's economic burden.
Federal legislation is also inadequate because it would eventually
fall victim to undue uniformity.275 To be sure, uniformity simplifies
decisionmaking ease and reduces administrative costs. 2 76 Such efficiency, however, inherently entails inflexibility and inequity. The
state that desires progressive environmental legislation may be frustrated by federal law allowing lower levels of pollution, and, likewise,
a state with pollutant industries would have to curtail such production.27 7 Despite their failure to match quality standards with local
needs, federal legislation is forced upon the states for the sake of uniformity. However, such uniformity needlessly limits the freedom of a
state to determine its own environmental and industrial needs.
VII.

FEDERAL COMMON LAW: THE BETTER APPROACH FOR AN
EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROVERSIES

The inadequacies of the Clean Water Act, evinced by its failure
to effectively abate interstate water pollution as well as the conclusions reached in recent Supreme Court decisions such as Milwaukee
274. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National EnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1220-21 (1977).
275. See Zerbe, supra note 14, at 212-13; see also Stewart, supra note 27, at 261.
("Legislatures and agencies have strong incentives to adopt uniform measures, which often do
not come to grips with [environmental] problems.").
• 276. See Zerbe, supra note 14, at 210.
277. See id. at 211.
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and Ouellette,2 79 compel the search for a more effective
approach to this intricate problem. One alternative lies in the federal
common law of nuisance, which might more effectively reach adequate and equitable solutions in water pollution controversies between
H1278

states. 280

The application of federal common law to interstate water pollution disputes is not a novelty. 28 ' Since the 1905 case of Missouri v.
Illinois2 2-the first interstate water pollution case to reach the
Supreme Court-the federal judiciary has repeatedly applied the doctrine of public nuisance to resolve interstate environmental disputes.2 83 The Supreme Court resorted to this cause of action because
it preserves the balance of power between the Supreme Court and
state government, and provides both a forum for the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes and a means for a state to protect its environmental integrity.28 4 In contrast, the Clean Water Act, as well as
the most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue, continue
to leave downstream states without an effective means of protecting
their environmental integrity. 2 5 This shortcoming of the Clean
Water Act calls for a return to the federal common law of public
nuisance as a more equitable and effective legal means to address
interstate water pollution disputes.
Nuisance is an equitable theory that offers redress to owners for
28 6
the impairment of the use and enjoyment of their real property.
The common law distinguishes between private and public nuisance.
278. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see supra notes 109-126 and
accompanying text (discussing Milwaukee II).
279. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see supra notes 128-148 and
accompanying text (discussing Ouellette).
280. See Comment, EnvironmentalLaw: New Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36
Mo. L. REV. 78, 79-84 (1971) (critiquing traditional public and private nuisance).
281. See supra Section II (presenting a historical perspective of federal common law
interstate water pollution disputes).
282. 200 U.S. 496 (1905); see supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing Missouri
v. Illinois).
283. See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1930) (garbage in waters);
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1930) (diversion of river); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296 (1920) (raw sewage in waters); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1914)
(industrial gas fumes); Mississippi v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1905) (sewage in river); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1901) (diversion of river); see also supra Section II.
284. Note, supra note 34, at 631-32.
285. See supra Sectio IV.
286. "Nuisance" is "[t]hat activity which arises from unreasonable, unwarranted or
unlawful use by a person of his own property, working obstruction or injury to right of
another, or to the public, and producing such material annoyance, inconvenience and
discomfort that law will presume resulting damage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1065 (6th
ed. 1990).
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Private nuisance occurs when there is an invasion of an owner's use
and enjoyment of an interest in land,28 7 whereas public nuisance
requires interference with common public rights.2"' Most importantly, the doctrine of nuisance focuses not on the behavior of the
actor, but on the effect of the actor's behavior upon the rights of
others. In determining whether a nuisance was created, courts focus
on the reasonableness of the invasion instead of on the conduct
28 9
itself.
Public nuisance in particular is "based on some interference with
the interests of the community, or the comfort or convenience of the
general public. ' 29 0 There are two requirements to establish such an
287. "A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977).
The requirements for private nuisance are:
1) The defendant acted with the intent of interfering with the use and enjoyment
of the land by those entitled to that use;
2) There was some interference with the use and enjoyment of the land of the
kind intended;
3) The interference and/or physical harm that resulted were substantial; and
4) The interference was unreasonable.
W. KEETON, D.

DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS 618, 622-23 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. Private nuisance rests
on the concept that "every person should use his own property as not to injure that of
another." J. KRIER, supra note 256, at 193 (citing Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C.
185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953)). Unlike trespass, private nuisance concerns interference with use or
enjoyment rather than exclusive possession. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 405 (2d ed. 1955).
288. A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977). It is "an act or omission which
obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to
all." W. PROSSER, supra note 287, at 405.
289. The Second Restatement generally defines an invasion as unreasonable if the gravity of
the invasion's harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 826 (1977).
The gravity of the harm is to be measured by:
a) the extent of the harm involved;
b) the character of the harm involved;
c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment
invaded;
d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character
of the locality; and
e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
Id. at § 827.
The utility of the actor's conduct considers:
a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct;
b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
Id. at § 828.
290. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 287, at § 90.
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action: (1) there must be an interference, and (2) that interference
must affect a right common to the general public. 291 The interference,
however, must consist of "more than slight inconvenience or petty
annoyance. '292 Although the cause of action requires that the nuisance be public, the entire community need not be affected. The
"public right" requirement will be satisfied "so long as the nuisance['
interfere[s] with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a
public right. '293 In the case of interstate water pollution, the public
right requirement would be met by proof that the out-of-state discharge interferes with the right of the public to drink, swim, or fish in
the particular interstate body of water. 294 Thus, in addressing public
nuisance claims, courts would necessarily consider all of the uses of
the water resource, a marked distinction from the blanket standard
set by the Clean Water Act.
A.

Advantages of the Application of Federal Common Law

Using judicial adjudication to address interstate pollution disputes has several advantages any federal legislative approach is sure to
lack. Perhaps the most significant advantage of a judicial approach is
its consideration of the multifaceted aspects 29 and specific facts of
each particularcase and its resolution of the dispute in a manner that
best reconciles the competing interests of each state. By employing
the nuisance concept, the courts could equitably acknowledge "the
[sovereign] right of a state to be free from injury caused by another
'
state."296
This acknowledgement would in turn be consistent with the
increasingly protective public policy towards the environment as evidenced by the passage of the Clean Water Act.29 7
Furthermore, by resorting to a federal common law cause of
291. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977).
292. Id. § 821F comment c.
293. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 287, at 645; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821B comment g (1977).
294. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1971) (Milwaukee I); New Jersey
v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1930); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921);
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1905); see also supra Section II for a discussion of these
cases.
295. Environmental problems consist of an intertwined complex of socioeconomical,
geographical, geological, and ecological issues.
296. Leybold, Federal Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards as a
Remedy in Federal Nuisance Actions, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 293, 299 (1978).
297. Section 1251(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act provides in pertinent part: "The objective
of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective, it is declared that ...(1) it is the national
goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985." 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1988).

1991]

DOWNSTREAM STATE REMEDIES

1183

action, the courts would be able to achieve and promote indispensable
values such as accommodation, legitimacy, self-determination, and
efficiency.298 In order to effectively resolve interstate water pollution
disputes, the chosen approach must equitably accommodate the conflicting interests of the states involved in the dispute.2 99 The Clean
Water Act is currently unable to accommodate such interests pre298. See Glicksman, supra note 265. Professor Glicksman represented these four values in
the following chart:
VALUES

Legitimacy

Individual
Liberty

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES(?)

YES

NO(?)

YES

Accommodation

Efficiency

Automatic
Statutory
Injunctive
Relief

Implied
Statutory
Rights of
Action

Federal
Common
Law

E
S

State
Common
Law (Intrastate)
State
Common Law (Interstate)

-

NO

YES

YES

NO(?)

YES

Reprinted from Glickman, FederalPreemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 121, 138 (1985) (emphasis added to the chart). © University of Pennsylvania
Law Review. The "Yes" indicates that the particular remedial alternative will achieve the
value indicated, and the "No" indicates that it will not achieve the particular value.
299. Professor Glicksman predicted the Oklahoma v. EPA scenario when he provided the
following examples:
[T]wo different states may disagree on the appropriate use of a particular
resource. For example, state A may designate a body of water as the appropriate
receptacle for the effluents of an industrial discharger located in that state. State
B, located downstream on the same body of water, may object that the
company's discharges reduce the value of the water to state B residents for
drinking or recreational purposes.
Id. at 135.
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cisely because of its broad policy nature. 3° It ignores the benefits of
more stringent water quality requirements, which in turn, eventually
lead to inequities such as the frustration of more progressive environmental protection.
Such inequities consequently undermine a most indispensable

value-legitimacy. A decision is legitimate, and thus credible, only if
"those affected by the decision accept the decisionmaking process
even if they do not agree with the merits of the decision. ' 301 Cur-

rently, the decisionmaking interstate water pollution and the Clean
Water Act generates skepticism and illegitimacy. Despite its apparent

purpose of abating water pollution, the Clean Water Act limits the
rights of states to protect their resources against discharges emanating
from upstream states. It does this by relegating the states to advisory
roles,30 2 and allowing the Administrator discretion to compel consideration of the affected state's water quality standards.30 3

The application of a federal common law cause of action also
fosters "self-determination" 3°4 and "individual liberty" 30 5-the touchstones underlying federalism. Noncentralized decisionmaking "can

better reflect geographical variations in preferences for collective
goods like environmental quality . . .[thus] fostering environmental

diversity" 306 while "protecting the basic personal integrity of the individual from harms imposed by others. ' 3 7 In fact, at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Wilson warned against the danger

of federal legislative despotism when he said that "if the Legislative
authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stabil300. Professor Stewart refers to this broadness as an attempt by Congress "to deal with
interstate conflicts on a 'wholesale' basis." Stewart, supra note 27, at 1220.
301. Glicksman, supra note 265, at 132.
302. See supra notes 215-20 & 234-47 and accompanying text.
303. Section 1341(a)(2) of the Clean Water Act provides in pertinent part:
Whenever such a discharge may affect, as determined by the Administrator, the
quality of the waters of any other State, the Administrator within thirty days of
the date of notice of application [for a discharging permit] shall so notify such
other State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the applicant. If, within sixty
days after receipt of such notification, such other State determines that such
discharge will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate any water quality
requirements in such State ....
the licensing or permitting agency shall hold such
a hearing .... Such agency .. .shall condition such license or permit in such

manner as may be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water quality
requirements.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
304. See Stewart, supra note 27, at 1196.
305. See Glicksman, supra note 265, at 121.
306. See Stewart, supra note 27, at 1210.
307. Glicksman, supra note 265, at 133.

1991]

DOWNSTREAM STATE REMEDIES

1185

ity."3 °8 Diversity will allow courts to uphold more stringent water
quality standards where they are necessary to protect affected states
from others' unreasonable pollution.
The application of federal common law to interstate water pollution disputes will also internalize the costs of pollution, thereby promoting efficiency." ° In effect, by holding them accountable, polluters
will consider the cost of their pollution when deciding on future
actions. Accordingly, their actions would be channeled towards a
more reasonable approach in using our national water resources, a
fundamental goal the Clean Water Act strives to achieve.
Federal common law would also make it easier for courts to
grant injunctions in interstate water disputes.3" ° Legal remedies are
often inadequate. 31' Consequently, plaintiffs in such disputes prefer
the court to grant an injunction rather than compensatory damages,
because of the serious and unremitting nature of pollution. If a discharge is serious and continuous, compensatory damages are not an
adequate measure of the injury and cannot protect the state from further harm. 3 1 2

Lack of protection from future harm is unfair because it allows
the defendant to continue polluting, amount to tacit condemnation of
the plaintiff's property.3 13 It is also burdensome to require the injured
plaintiff to repeatedly resort to the courts. 314 This system ultimately
proves to be costly for the litigants, ineffective in abating pollution,
and inefficient for the courts, which must address the same case again
and again. In addition, an injunction, unlike compensatory damages,
does not burden the courts with the almost impossible task of apportioning damages where several dischargers are responsible for the
same nuisance.315 Most importantly, such injunctions enhance the
308. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949 (1983) (quoting 1 M. FERRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (1911)).
309. See Comment, supra note 27, at 734; Comment, Uniformity Is the Solution to Water
Pollution, 23 S.TEX. L.J. 417, 419 (1982).
310. The equitable decision of whether or not to issue an injunction involves the process of
"balancing of the equities." Professors Prosser and Keeton define this process as balancing
"the relative equities of the parties and the interests of the public and an injunction issued or
denied as the balance seems to indicate." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 287, at 631.
311. See Note, Water Quality Standards in PrivateNuisance Actions, 79 YALE L.J. 102, 109
(1969) ("The legal remedy tends to be insufficient in nuisance actions ....").
312. Id. ("[Mionetary damages are in any event inadequate if the private nuisance action is

to prove an effective control on pollution.").
313. Id. ("[T]o limit compensation to the injured riparian by damages is to permit the
polluter to condemn another's property for private use.").
314. Comment, supra note 27, at 747 ("Especially when the pollution is part of a pattern
and practice, broad injunctive relief is both economical and effective.").
315. Id. ("[T]he technical problems of segregating damages are avoided.").
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policy of the Clean Water Act while preserving the sovereign rights of
downstream states.
After deciding on an injunction, the courts must then carefully
fashion the remedy. Certain principles should underlie each remedial
injunction. First, judges need to avoid merely giving extraterritorial
effect to the downstream state's water quality standards. a 6 The remedy must be consistent with the nuisance cause of action. Therefore,
the courts must address the problem by focusing on the reasonableness of the source state's use of the body of water and the interference
with the downstream state's public right.3 1 If courts enjoin source
states and the dischargers located within their borders from violating
the water quality standards of the affected downstream states without
inquiring into the reasonableness and interference of each of the uses,
they effectively impose the laws of one state upon another. More significantly, they frustrate the purpose of the common law remedy of
injunction-balancing the equities.
Second, the remedy must be sufficiently specific to be effective
and efficient. To attain this goal, courts should determine the water
quality that they deem reasonable. 318 This prevents future squabbles
about the precise definition of "reasonableness."
Third, courts should allow dischargers a "reasonable time in
which to reduce their discharge."3 9 The courts thereby fulfill their
role as courts of equity by reconciling the interests of the affected state
in protecting its environment with the interests of the source state in
protecting its economic stability. Also, courts will be effectuating the
ultimate goal-eliminating the nuisance in order to protect the
environment.
316. See Leybold, supra note 296, at 312 ("Imposing the standards merely because they are
more desirable would be a bold usurpation of legislative and administrative functions."). It is
precisely for this reason that the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v. EPA is faulty.
Contrary to the court's determination that the more stringent water quality standards imposed
by Oklahoma were transformed into federal law when they were approved by EPA, the
imposition of such standards merely gave extraterritorial effect to state law.
317. See supra notes 279-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonableness
inquiry.
318. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915), provides an example of a
specific remedy that was awarded by the Supreme Court sitting in equity in an interstate
pollution dispute. In that case, the Court required that the discharger
shall not permit the escape into the air of fumes carrying more than 45% of the
sulphur contained in the green ore subjected to smelting.... It shall not permit
escape into the air of gases the total sulphur content of which shall exceed 20
tons during one day from April 10th to October 1st of each year or exceed 40
tons in one day during any other season.
Id. at 478.
319. Note, supra note 311, at 110.
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One example of a federal court exercising its equitable powers to
effectuate a practical solution is New Jersey v. City of New York. 320 In
that case, the Supreme Court recognized that New York City's pollution caused a public nuisance for New Jersey, and thus granted an
injunction. However, noting the limitations faced by the discharging
state, the Court exercised its equitable powers to allow the City of
New York sufficient time to construct the facilities needed to abate
the nuisance.32 '

Given the multifaceted nature of interstate water pollution disputes, the most effective and efficient method of resolving these disputes while simultaneously abating pollution is to reinstate the federal
common law of public nuisance. A judicial resolution of the problem
would promote advantages such as accommodation, legitimacy, selfdetermination, and efficiency by avoiding the inequity of undue uniformity and myopic administrative efficiency.
B.

Possible Criticism

In spite of the advantages of using federal common law, the
approach is not free from criticism.32 2 Critics of the adjudicatory
approach focus primarily on three areas: an apparent lack of uniformity of federal common law, the procedural issues, and various
institutional concerns.323 It is true that federal common law, like any
other means of addressing the complex issue of interstate pollution, is
not a panacea. However, the concerns surrounding the application of
federal common law are either minimal or illusory.
1.

LACK OF UNIFORMITY

Perhaps the strongest criticism of a federal common law
approach to the interstate pollution situation is that its apparent lack
of uniformity would lead to unpredictability. Critics who adhere to
this belief argue that federal regulatory programs provide national
uniformity. Such uniformity is possible if the statute itself forbade
diversity. However, the Clean Water Act does not forbid diversity,
but rather authorizes individual states to impose more stringent water
quality standards than the national standard.3 24 Hence, the Clean
320. See supra notes 226-63 and accompanying text.
321. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 481 (1931).
322. See, e.g., Post, Federal Common Law Suits to Abate Interstate Air Pollution, 4 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (1980); Zerbe, supra note 14, at 193; Comment, supra note 27, at 734;
Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1972);
Comment, supra note 309, at 417.
323. See Zerbe, supra note 14, at 193.
324. Section 1370 of the Clean Water Act provides in pertinent part: "[S]uch State... may
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Water Act itself fosters disunity. A perfect case in point is Oklahoma
v. EPA,3 25 where the State of Oklahoma adopted more stringent EPAapproved state water quality standards than its neighboring state,
Arkansas.3 26
Despite initial impression, however, federal common law is
indeed capable of producing acceptable national uniformity and predictability, while preserving adaptability to specific cases.32 7 The
courts could develop a uniform national legal standard based upon
whether the source state's discharge is unreasonable and whether the
interference with the affected downstream state's right is significant.
The states would be bound by this standard in disputes between themselves. The state water quality standards, however, would still be
applied within each state. Therefore, resort to the federal courts
would be limited to instances where a state is suing another state,
claiming that the upstream state is causing a public nuisance.
Carefully developed federal common law would foster the most
effective type of uniformity.3 2 8 As mentioned earlier, the broad minimum level of regulation standard adopted by the Clean Water Act
and other federal statutes has created undue uniformity.3 29 This effectively sacrifices progressive environmental protection in favor of uniform minimal requirements. Perhaps it is more feasible to keep the
water clean in most parts of the country, allowing pollution in designated industrial areas so long as downstream states are not unreasonably affected.33 ° It would not be environmentally unwise to choose
such a realistic approach. The current sacrifice of progressive environmental protection in favor of the illusory ideal of uniformity, however, is counterproductive approach in solving pollution disputes.
not adopt or enforce.., any effluent standard ...which is less stringent than the ...effluent

standard ... under this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 1370(l)(A) (1988). "Both the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act expressly authorize the states to develop and apply their own
emission limitations, provided those limitations are at least as stringent as the federal controls.
The only uniformity required by the statutes is adherence to the minimum federal standards
found necessary by Congress and the EPA to protect health and the environment."
Glicksman, supra note 265, at 200.
325. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990).
326. See supra notes 149-264 and accompanying text.
327. If the courts make federal common law remedies available in interstate water pollution
disputes, they would "allow the development of uniform principles for resolving interstate
water pollution disputes and at the same time would not deprive injured persons of an
opportunity to seek a remedy which they would otherwise have in the purely intrastate
context." Kosloff, State Law Remedies for Interstate Water Pollution: The Legacy of Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10136, 10141 (1986).
328. See Zerbe, supra note 14, at 213 (current environmental statutes are rendered
ineffective and inequitable by undue uniformity).
329. Id.
330. See id. at 209.
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PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The procedural issues raised by the application of federal common law nuisance to interstate water pollution disputes, while real,
are likewise surmountable. The first procedural issue to confront a
plaintiff state is whether it has standing to sue. This problem is of
little significance because states have standing under the doctrine of
parens patriae.3 3 1
The next issue is whether the defendant state is amenable to suit.
This concern raises the interrelated issue of jurisdiction. This problem is likewise surmountable, because the Constitution grants the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction in controversies between two or
more states.3 32 If private dischargers cause pollution, the responsibility of the source state is more attenuated. This procedural hurdle,
however, is easily overcome by applying the doctrine of respondeat
patriae, also known as reverse parens patriae.3 33 With the application
of this doctrine, the downstream state would not be left helpless in the
face of procedural obstacles.
3.

INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

Institutional concerns surrounding the application of federal
common law to interstate water pollution disputes question the technical and institutional competence of the judiciary in the complex
field of environmental law. Remarking on the inherently technical
nature of environmental law suits, some commentators argue that the
judges are not trained to address the issues involved in such disputes.33 4 Although such an observation may be true in certain cases,
it is nonetheless not incurable. Judges could appoint masters3 35 and
331. See generally Note, State Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae
Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 411 (1970).
332. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
333. See Post, supra note 323, at 135; Stewart, supra note 274, at 1248. Professor Stewart
suggests:
Since states can obtain an award of relief for pollution-related injuries suffered by
their citizens, they should be reciprocally liable for comparable damage
attributable to their citizens. Accordingly, injured states should be permitted to
invoke a reverse parens patriae principle by requiring an originating state to
control private sources of spillover pollution.

Id.
334. See, e.g., Note, supra note 322, at 1453 (arguing that it is beyond the courts' technical
competence to properly consider all environmental interests).
335. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(a) The court in which any action is pending may appoint a special master
therein. As used in these rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor,
an examiner, and an assessor
(b) .... In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when

1190

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1137

call expert witnesses to testify.33 6 Still another solution for the appel-

late courts has been suggested by Judge Leventhal. 3 a7 He has suggested that "an appellate court needs ...an aide who is ...a kind of
hybrid between a master and a scientific law clerk . . . to advise a

court so that it could better understand the record. ' 338 Moreover, it
is unpersuasive to argue that the judiciary is unable to handle complex issues when courts are accustomed to solving other types of disputes involving similarly complex issues under numerous federal
statutes.
Commentators also argue that federal environmental protection,
by its very nature, requires the implementation of broad policies
which must simultaneously consider a large number of diverse interests.339 These commentators, however, ignore the very role of courts
of equity-to reconcile competing interests. Moreover, what better
way is there to reach the most adequate result to a pollution problem
than through the application of a tailored remedy?
Finally, commentators who question the technical and institutional incompetence of the judiciary fail to consider that courts currently hear technical environmental cases under the Citizen Suits
Provision of the Clean Water Act. 34 Therefore, technical environmental issues will not be additionally burdensome on the courts.
Moreover, courts currently make such decisions in environmental disputes brought in state court under the states' common law causes of
the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of
account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only
upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53.

336. Rule 706(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the
parties to submit nominations.... A witness so appointed shall advise the parties
of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party;
and the witness may be called to testify by the court or any party. The witness

shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the
witness.
FED. R. EvID. 706(a).

337. Judge Leventhal is a circuit judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.
338. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509, 550 (1974).
339. Note, supra note 323, at 1453 (arguing that the interests involved in environmental

disputes are too diverse and numerous to be represented in the court at the same time);
Comment, supra note 309, at 419 (contending that judicial decisions are designed to achieve
only specific solutions and not the broad policies required by the pollution problem).
340. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

After the Supreme Court's decision in Milwaukee II, which held
that the Clean Water Act was so comprehensive that it effectively preempted federal common law, downstream states were left only with
the Act itself and the state common law causes of action to remedy
the harm caused by upstream discharges. The options were further
diminished when the Supreme Court held in Ouellette that an out-ofstate plaintiff may only resort to the common law of the discharger's
state, the source state. It was in this scenario of increased restrictions
and diminished legal recourse for affected downstream plaintiffs that
the Tenth Circuit decided the case of Oklahoma v. EPA.
Faced with the conflicting water quality standards of Oklahoma
and Arkansas, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the Clean Water
Act requires point sources to comply with the federally approved
water quality standards of affected downstream states. ' 342 However,
given the insufficient and indeterminate legislative history on the issue
of interstate water pollution between states, the court's holding was
too expansive. Niether the plain text nor in the legislative history of
the Clean Water Act indicate that Congress intended that downstream states indirectly regulate all upstream states.
.The Clean Water Act itself, however, does not provide states
with an effective, equitable method for resolving interstate water pollution controversies. The "advisory role" given to affected states by
the Clean Water Act is rendered increasingly illusory by the Administrator's discretionary veto power over NPDES permits. These inadequacies beckon the adoption of an alternative non-statutory method
for dealing with interstate water pollution controversies between
states. Courts should therefore resort once again to the federal common law of public nuisance which was employed by the federal courts
during the early part of the twentieth century. Those cases which
applied the federal common law proved that the adjudicatory method
is very capable of producing equitable, yet effective, environmental
decisions.
By the very nature of the equitable cause of action of public nuisance, the courts, unlike the regulatory agencies, could analyze the
multifaceted issues inherent in interstate water pollution disputes.
Such a method would necessarily focus on the reasonableness of the
341. According to Ouellette, injured parties may bring state common
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497-500 (1986).
342. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 634 (10th Cir. 1990).

law suits.
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discharge and on the significance of the interference, thereby respecting the sovereignty of individual states. Moreover, the adjudicatory
method would foster the valuable principles of accommodation, legitimacy, self-determination, and efficiency. Equitable adjudication
would also be beneficial by eliminating the myopic "values" of administrative efficiency and undue uniformity.
The Supreme Court can reinstate the federal common law of
public nuisance for application in disputes between states such as
Oklahoma v. EPA without overruling Ouellette and Milwaukee II.
The Court could distinguish these cases. At the outset, these two
Supreme Court precedents are distinguishable in that they dealt with
the application of common law while Oklahoma v. EPA deals with
federally-approved state water quality standards.143 In addition,
Ouellette can be further distinguished by the difference in the party
composition of both cases, namely that in Ouellette the parties were
not states but private citizens. Thus, the Court could render Ouellette
inapplicable by limiting the holding in Oklahoma v. EPA to suits
involving states.
Admittedly, distinguishing Milwaukee II would be more difficult,
though not impossible. Inevitably however, the Court would have to
reconsider whether the Clean Water Act can still be honestly characterized as all-encompassing. 344 As discussed earlier in this Comment,
the legislative history of the Clean Water Act does not support this
contention.345 Moreover, a reconsideration of the Court's conclusion
in Milwaukee H would not require a departure from the principles
presented therein. In Milwaukee II, the Court announced that federal
common law is permissible when there exists a "significant conflict
3 46
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law."
Under such standard, the Court would still be able to reinstate federal
common law in interstate water pollution disputes between states.
The egression would be limited to the interpretation of the term
employed in the standard. The Court would have to recognize that
there exists a significant conflict between the federal policy of pollution abatement, the interest in a uniform, yet effective and equitable,
method for implementing that policy in a neutral forum, and the limited recourses available to downstream states under state law. On the
343. In Milwaukee II, the plaintiffs filed an action under federal common law. In Ouellette,
the plaintiffs filed an action under state common law.
344. In Milwaukee II, the Supreme Court concluded that "Congress... occupied the field
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program." City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
345. See supra notes 149-264 and accompanying text.
346. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313.
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other hand, the Court could opt for a more cautious alternative and
merely reverse the Tenth Circuit's broad holding by constraining its
decision to the mundane issue of administrative deference.
The final solution, however, will be made by the Supreme
Court.347 The Court will thus have another opportunity to consider,
as it did in Milwaukee II, whether the Clean Water Act is so comprehensive as to provide remedies for affected downstream states.34 This
Comment has argued that the Clean Water Act's inadequacy on the
issue of interstate water pollution is evident in the fact that it does not
provide an effective and equitable remedy for such problems.
In order to cultivate legitimacy and credibility, our laws must
not merely provide illusory remedies, but effective ones. As Chief Justice Marshall wisely wrote: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. ' 34 9 Can we honestly conclude
that the Clean Water Act affords affected downstream states a "remedy" which would justify the preemption of federal common law?
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